finding no federal question jurisdiction and no Article III case or controversy
How later courts described this case
- finding no federal question jurisdiction and no Article III case or controversy
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322 (1997)
Parretti is distinguishable on the grounds, among others, that it speaks only to the probable cause showing which must be made at an extradition hearing and the circumstances in which bail can be denied, and does not speak to incompetence to stand trial.
The opinion
PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
During the course of these extradition proceedings, Gianearlo Parretti was released from custody on bail and fled the country. When a criminal defendant becomes a fugitive from justice, courts have discretion to dismiss the defendant’s appeal because his absence “disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determi *1391 nation of his claims.” Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 , 90 S.Ct. 498, 499 , 24 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970) (per curiam); see also Roby v. United States Dep’t of the Navy, 76 F.3d 1052 , 1055 n. 2 (9th Cir.1996) (noting that the court would have discretion to dismiss case based on disentitlement theory where plaintiff took unauthorized leave from the Navy); United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048, 1054 (9th Cir.1991) (noting long history of equitable doctrine of fugitive disentitlement).
Dismissal is an appropriate option under the disentitlement doctrine because dismissal preserves this court’s “interest in efficient, dignified appellate practice.” Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 242 , 113 S.Ct. 1199, 1204-05 , 122 L.Ed.2d 581 (1993). Moreover, Parretti’s flight threatens the effective operation of the appellate process. Parretti’s counsel may have no desire to represent Parretti zealously in future proceedings that may result from the majority’s opinion (e.g., petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc, en banc review, or appeal to the Supreme Court). In addition, this court no longer has control over one of the parties-Parretti. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 724 , 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1595-96 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining how the adversary character of the litigation may be compromised when one of the litigants is a fugitive) (citing Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366 , 90 S.Ct. at 498-99 ). Because Parretti’s fugitive status creates the risk that the adversary process will not effectively function, we should exercise our discretion and dismiss the present appeal.