holding that an investigatory inter- view was clearly non-custodial and that the confession was voluntary when the interview took place in the suspect’s mother’s home, the suspect freely consented to answer the officers’ questions, and the suspect was at liberty to terminate the discussion at any time
How later courts described this case
- holding that an investigatory inter- view was clearly non-custodial and that the confession was voluntary when the interview took place in the suspect’s mother’s home, the suspect freely consented to answer the officers’ questions, and the suspect was at liberty to terminate the discussion at any time
- ruling officer's statement " '[i]f you're not coming clean ... you can do five years,' " was "simply not an implied promise of non-prosecution" and did not suggest that if defendant "did 'come clean' he would not face jail time" (internal quotation marks omitted)
- recognizing that a law “enforcement officer may 21 properly tell the truth to the accused,” and that “[t]ruthful statements about [the defendant’s] predicament are not the type of ‘coercion’ that threatens to render a statement involuntary.”
- recognizing that a law “enforcement officer may properly tell the truth to the accused,” and that “[t]ruthful statements about [the defendant’s] 12 predicament are not the type of ‘coercion’ that threatens to render a statement involuntary.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. Trooper Ballard’s threat that Braxton would face five years in jail if he did not “come clean” and confess and his implied promise that Braxton would not face jail time if he did confess were clearly sufficient “to cause [Braxton’s] will to be overborne and his capacity for selfdetermination to be critically impaired.” Ferguson v. Boyd, 566 F.2d 873, 877 (4th Cir.1977).
I.
The Supreme Court has held that when “a question arises whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is controlled by that portion of the [F]ifth [A]mendment to the [C]onstitution of the United States commanding that no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.’ ” Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 , 18 S.Ct. 183, 186 , 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). The constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of the officers in obtaining the confession was shocking, but whether the confession was “ ‘free and voluntary.’ ” Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 , 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) (quoting Bram, 168 U.S. at 542 , 18 S.Ct. at 187 ). More specifically, the test for determining whether a statement is voluntary is “whether the confession was ‘extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.’” Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 , 97 S.Ct. 202, 203 , 50 L.Ed.2d 194 (1976) (alterations in original) (quoting Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-13 , 18 S.Ct. at 187 ). The proper inquiry focuses on whether, as a matter of law, under the totality of the circumstances, “the defendant’s will has been ‘overborne’ or his ‘capacity for self-determination critically impaired.’ ” United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1071 (4th Cir.1987) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)).
I disagree with the majority opinion’s application of those principles in the instant case. Part II.B. of the majority opinion *787 holds that Trooper Ballard’s “coming clean” statement did not constitute coercive police conduct. The majority points out that a law-enforcement officer may lawfully tell the defendant the truth. The majority then concludes that Trooper Ballard’s statement was not a coercive threat because he merely told Braxton the “truth,” namely, that he could serve five years in jail either for making a false statement on a firearms record, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 924 (a)(1)(A) (West Supp.1997), or for making a false statement during an investigatory interview, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West Supp.1997).
It is far from clear, however, that Trooper Ballard’s statement that Braxton could “do five years because [he was] not coming clean” referred to either § 924(a)(1)(A) or § 1001. Indeed, the officers did not tell Braxton, nor was Braxton aware, that he was under investigation for making false statements on a firearms record, in violation of § 924(a)(1)(A). The district court reached a plausible conclusion that Trooper Ballard’s statement constituted a threat that Braxton would face five years in jail if he did not confess.
Moreover, the district court also reached a plausible conclusion that the statement contained an implied promise that Braxton would not face the same penalty if he did confess. Braxton easily could have inferred from Trooper Ballard’s statement that he would not face jail time if he did “come clean” and confess and that answering the questions therefore would be to his benefit. As stated above, the Supreme Court has clearly held that “implied promises, however slight,’’ render a confession involuntary. Ross, 429 U.S. at 30 , 97 S.Ct. at 203 (emphasis added) (quoting Bra®, 168 U.S. at 542-43 , 18 S.Ct. at 186-87 ).
I recognize that we must consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding Trooper Ballard’s statement. Nonetheless, even under the totality of the circumstances, I would still hold that Braxton’s confession was involuntary. An officer’s threat that the defendant will serve five years in jail if he does not confess and an officer’s implied promise that the defendant will not serve any time if he does confess clearly are “sufficient to cause the [defendant’s] will to be overborne and his capacity for self-determination to be critically impaired.” Ferguson, 566 F.2d at 877 . Trooper Ballard’s threat and implied promise were sufficiently coercive to render Braxton’s confession involuntary, even though Trooper Ballard threatened Braxton at home rather than in a police station.
II.
Accordingly, I would affirm the district court’s judgment. I dissent.