holding that although police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, the defendant's act of pulling a gun on a police officer as the officer chased him on foot constituted a "new crime that was distinct from any crime he might have been suspected of at the time of the initial stop"
How later courts described this case
- holding that although police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, the defendant's act of pulling a gun on a police officer as the officer chased him on foot constituted a "new crime that was distinct from any crime he might have been suspected of at the time of the initial stop"
- holding that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion where a plaintiff entered the car of a person who was known to the officers as having recently completed a prison sentence for narcotics violations and made hand movements consistent with a covert exchange
- finding that a defendant's "own illegal acts after the initial [constitutional violation] trigger[s] an exception to the exclusionary rule" because the defendant's response "is itself a new, distinct crime" (citation and quotation marks omitted)
- reasoning that once the defendant pulled a gun on the police officer, the police officer "had probable cause to arrest [the defendant] because the new crime purged the taint of the prior illegal stop"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Taylor, 388 S.C. 101 (2010)
Id. Accordingly, the court found Lender was distinguishable and not controlling.
The opinion
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I am pleased to concur in parts I and III of the opinion for the court and I concur in the judgment. Because I would conclude that experienced officers such as those involved here had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Sprinkle was engaged in criminal activity, and therefore justified in conducting a Terry stop, see United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151 (4th Cir.1993), I dissent from part II.