holding that a per se rule requiring courts to allow defense counsel to ask prospective jurors whether they would be biased in favor of law-enforcement witnesses offends the deference traditionally accorded the trial court’s conduct of voir dire
How later courts described this case
- holding that a per se rule requiring courts to allow defense counsel to ask prospective jurors whether they would be biased in favor of law-enforcement witnesses offends the deference traditionally accorded the trial court’s conduct of voir dire
- stating, in the context of a challenge to voir dire, that "an appellate court [cannot] easily second-guess the conclusions of the decision- maker who heard and observed the witnesses" (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding further inquiry into contents of police officer’s disciplinary file because further inquiry would have been cumulative
- observing that "[v]oir dire plays an essential role in guaranteeing a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury," in that voir dire "enabl[es] the court to select an impartial jury and assist[s] counsel in exercising peremptory chal- lenges" (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
For the reasons set forth in parts I and II of Judge Mumaghan’s excellent dissenting opinion, I believe the Constitution requires the rule adopted in United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.1990). Moreover, for many of the same reasons, even if the Constitution did not mandate this rule, I believe we could and should require it pursuant to our supervising powers. See Mu’Min v. Virgi nia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 , 111 S.Ct. 1899, 1903 , 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991); United States v. *754 Anagnos, 853 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.1988). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.