Opinion

Florida Audubon Society v. Lloyd M. Bentsen, Secretary of the Treasury, and Margaret Richardson, Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service

  • 94 F.3d 658
  • 320 U.S. App. D.C. 324
  • 27 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20098
  • 43 ERC (BNA) 1072
  • 78 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6161
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Aug 20, 1996
Status
Published
Author
Buckley
On the bench
Edwards, Wald, Silberman, Buckley, Williams, Ginsburg, Sentelle, Henderson, Randolph, Rogers, Tatel
Cited by
618 cases

holding that injury-in-fact test was not satisfied and plaintiffs did not have standing to bring action where no EIS was prepared upon Secretary of the Treasury’s extension of a tax credit for use of certain gasoline-ethanol blends to use of *254 blends of gasoline and a fuel additive derived from but not containing ethanol; injury was based on a “lengthy chain of conjecture”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that injury-in-fact test was not satisfied and plaintiffs did not have standing to bring action where no EIS was prepared upon Secretary of the Treasury’s extension of a tax credit for use of certain gasoline-ethanol blends to use of *254 blends of gasoline and a fuel additive derived from but not containing ethanol; injury was based on a “lengthy chain of conjecture”
  • concluding that wildlife organizations failed to establish causation in challenge to tax credits for alternative fuel additive that allegedly caused more ethanol production, which increased corn and sugar production, which in turn increased agricultural pollution, which would allegedly impact areas inhabited by wildlife
  • holding that Plaintiffs failed to produce competent evidence of injury where they relied on expert’s speculative testimony that a tax credit would encourage farmers to increase corn or sugar production in a manner that would increase agricultural pollution and damage wildlife areas
  • holding that petitioners’ standing in challenging IRS’s rulemaking, in which IRS promulgated a *699 tax credit for gasoline additives without preparing an environmental impact, is determined in accordance with “procedural-rights” line of cases deriving from Lujan

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge,

concurring:

I agree with the dissent that the court’s opinion imposes an unduly heavy burden on appellants to establish standing in a NEPA challenge. Quite simply, the court now requires that a litigant be able to establish the nature and likelihood of the environmental injury that it is the purpose of an environmental impact statement to identify. We had it essentially right in City of Los Angeles. Nevertheless, because I agree that appellants have failed to establish the necessary “nexus” between the tax credit and the injuries they foresee, I must concur in the judgment of the court. I say “must” because I regret that the court has adopted new criteria for the establishment of standing in NEPA cases that will erode the effectiveness of one of the most important environmental measures of the past generation.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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