United States v. James D. Soderna

*1380 KANNE, Circuit Judge,

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

Today, this court decides that the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act does not violate the First Amendment — a decision with which I concur. The majority continues on, however, to hold that a first violation of the Act involving exclusively nonviolent physical obstruction — which under 18 U.S.C. § 248 (b) is punishable by up to both six months in prison and a $10,000 fine — is a “petty” crime, meaning that the defendants charged with such a violation have no constitutional right to a trial by jury. Because I believe that this holding misconstrues relevant Supreme Court precedent and disregards objective evidence of Congress’s express intent, from it I must respectfully dissent.

I

It has long been well established in Supreme Court case law that the constitutional right to a trial by jury does not extend to petty offenses. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 , 8 S.Ct. 1301, 1307 , 32 L.Ed. 223 (1888); Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621, 624 , 11 S.Ct. 636, 637 , 35 L.Ed. 288 (1891). According to the Court, what offenses are petty should be determined “not subjectively by recourse of the judge to his own sympathy and emotions, but by objective standards such as may be observed in the laws and practices of the community taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments.” District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 , 57 S.Ct. 660, 663 , 81 L.Ed. 843 (1937).

To this end, the Supreme Court has consistently looked to the state and federal legislatures for guidance as to which crimes should be considered petty and which should be considered serious. The Court instructs that “[t]he judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that of a legislature, which is ‘far better equipped to perform the task, and [is] likewise more responsive to changes in attitude and more amenable to the recognition and correction of their misperceptions in this respect.’ ” Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 , 541 — 42, 109 S.Ct, 1289, 1292 , 103 L.Ed.2d 550 (1989) (quoting Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1209 (5th Cir.1988) (en banc)).

Uncovering the enacting legislature’s judgment of a crime’s seriousness entails a two-step interpretive process. First, the Court looks to the crime’s statutorily prescribed maximum authorized penalty because, in enacting the maximum penalty, “the legislature has included within the definition of the crime itself a judgment about the seriousness of the offense.” 1 Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 , 89 S.Ct. 1503, 1505 , 23 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969) (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 162 n. 35, 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 1454 n. 35, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968)). Second, the Court examines whether that particular maximum penalty indicates a legislative determination of pettiness or one of seriousness. “In determining whether the length of the authorized prison term or the seriousness of other punishment is enough in itself to require a jury trial,” the Court compares the penalty against “objective criteria, chiefly the existing laws and practices in the Nation.” Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161 , 88 S.Ct. at 1453 . Thus, in case after case the Supreme Court has determined the seriousness of an offense by considering its maximum authorized penalty in light of Congress’s statutory definition of “petty offense” in 18 U.S.C. § 19 (and its predecessor, 18 U.S.C. § 1 ), see Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-80 , 86 S.Ct. 1523, 1526 , 16 L.Ed.2d 629 .(1966); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62 , 88 S.Ct. at 1453-54 ; Frank, 395 U.S. at 150-52 , 89 S.Ct. at 1506-07 ; Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70-71 , 90 S.Ct. 1886, 1889 , 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970); Blanton, 489 U.S. at 544-45 , 109 S.Ct. at 1294 , as well as in light of the prevailing practice among the fifty states concerning what penalties may be imposed absent a juty trial, see Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161 & n. 33, 88 S.Ct. at. 1454 & n. 33; Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 71 -72 & n. 18, 90 S.Ct. at 1889 -90 & n. 18; Blanton, 489 U.S. at 544 — 45, 109 S.Ct. at 1294 .

*1381 Congress’s statutory definition of “petty offense” in 18 U.S.C. § 19 includes all crimes punishable by no more than six months in prison, by a fine not greater than $6,000 for an individual or $10,000 for an organization, or both. 2 Many states have conformed their practices of granting jury trials in criminal cases to the federal benchmark, while some have enacted more generous standards, including extending the right to trial by jury to all crimes where any term of imprisonment may be imposed. 3

By comparison to these legislative pronouncements, the Supreme Court has held that a crime punishable by more than six months in prison is always serious for purposes of the constitutional right to a jury trial. Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 71-74 , 90 S.Ct. at 1889-91 . “We cannot ... conclude that ... administrative conveniences, in light of the practices that now exist in every one of the fifty States as well as in the federal courts, can ... justify denying an accused the important right to trial by jury where the possible penalty exceeds six months’ imprisonment.” Id. at 73-74 , 90 S.Ct. at 1890-91 .

On the other hand, the question of at what point a penalty other than imprisonment (such as a fine or term of probation) rises to the level of seriousness necessary to implicate the right to a jury trial remains unanswered. The Supreme Court has indicated that, despite a maximum potential imprisonment of no more than six months, such other penalties could render a crime serious enough to warrant a jury trial. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543 , 109 S.Ct. at 1293 . But because the Court has never been confronted with a case where it has considered the crime’s other potential penalties to be sufficiently serious, the. line has never been drawn. Nevertheless, we are given some guidance because, as discussed below, the four cases wherein the Supreme Court has addressed the seriousness of penalties other than imprisonment have — like the cases considering terms of imprisonment — looked to *1382 the judgments expressed by the state and federal legislatures concerning what is serious and what is petty.

In Frank v. United States, the defendant had been convicted of criminal contempt in federal court and sentenced to a three-year term of probation. 395 U.S. at 148 , 89 S.Ct. at 1504-05 . The Court first noted that prior decisions had relied upon Congress’s definition of “petty offense” in 18 U.S.C. § 1 . Id. at 150 n. 3, 89 S.Ct. at 1506 n. 3. It then observed that in enacting the probation statute, Congress had made the possibility of probation applicable to “any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment,” i.e., to both petty and serious offenses alike. 4 Id. at 150 , 89 S.Ct. at 1506 . “Therefore,” the Court reasoned, “the maximum penalty authorized in petty offense cases is not simply six months’ imprisonment and a $500 fine. A petty offender may be placed on probation for up to five years....” Id. at 150-51 , 89 S.Ct. at 1506 . The Court thus concluded: “Petitioner’s sentence is within the limits of the congressional definition of petty offenses. Accordingly, it- was not error to deny him a jury trial.” Id. at 152 , 89 S.Ct. at 1507 .

In Muniz v. Hoffman, the defendant, a union organization, had been convicted of criminal contempt and sentenced to pay a $10,000 fine. 422 U.S. 454, 457 , 95 S.Ct. 2178, 2181 , 45 L.Ed.2d 319 (1975). At the time Muniz was decided, Congress’s “petty offense” definition in 18 U.S.C. § 1 placed the upper limit for fines at $500; however, the definition did not (as 18 U.S.C. § 19 does today) specifically address what fine level would be considered serious for an organization as opposed to an individual. The union argued that because the fine imposed was greater than $500, it was automatically enti-tied to a trial by jury. The Court disagreed and refused to blindly apply the congressional definition to all circumstances because it did not believe that the definition could plausibly be read to suggest Congress’s judgment that a fine over $500 will always be serious, even when imposed upon a large organization. Id. at 477 , 95 S.Ct. at 2191 . The Court explained that “[i]t is not difficult to grasp the proposition that six months in jail is a serious matter for any individual, but it is not tenable to argue that the possibility of a $501 fine would be considered a serious risk to a large corporation or labor union.” Id. In conclusion, the Court further considered the relative financial impact of the fine on the union: “This union ... collects dues from some 13,000 persons; and although the fine is not insubstantial, it is not of such magnitude that the union was deprived of whatever right to jury trial it might have under the Sixth Amendment.” Id.

Thus, the Supreme Court refused to rely upon 18 U.S.C. § 1 in Muniz only because it did not believe that the definition represent ed a legislative judgment of seriousness with respect to a fine levied on a large organization. Accordingly, our sister circuits have interpreted the Muniz holding as limited exclusively to fines imposed upon organizations, and therefore they have consistently relied upon the congressional definition of “petty offense” when considering the seriousness of fines levied on individual defendants. 5 The majority, unlike these other circuits, expresses incredulity that the difference between an .individual and an organization could be constitutionally relevant. Supra, at 1379. However, Congress expressed its judgment that what fine level indicates seriousness for purposes of the right to a jury trial differs *1383 between individuals and organizations when, in amending the definition of “petty offense” in 1984, it enacted a much higher maximum fine for organizations than for individuals (interestingly enough, $10,000, the amount the Supreme Court considered petty when levied against an organization in Muniz). See Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-696, § 8 , 98 Stat. 3134 , 3138. From the legislative history of this enactment, it is apparent that the rationales of Congress for the differing fine levels between individuals and organizations were twofold. First, Congress indicated its belief that organizations generally have greater resources than individuals. H.R. Rep. No. 98-906, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16, 19 (1984), reprinted at 1984 U.S.C.C.AN. 5433, 5447-48, 5452. Secondly, and most importantly, Congress explained that because an organization cannot be imprisoned in addition to paying a fine as an individual can, a higher fine must be levied against an organization in order to attain the same level of severity presented by a combination of imprisonment and a lower fine imposed upon an individual. Id,

In Blanton v. City of Las Vegas, the Supreme Court considered the seriousness of a Nevada drunk driving law, under which a defendant faced a possibility of up to six months in prison (or alternatively, forty-eight hours of community service wearing clothing identifying him as a DUI offender), á fine of up to $1,000, loss of his driver’s license for ninety days, and a requirement to attend an alcohol abuse education course at his own expense. 489 U.S. at 539-40 , 109- S.Ct. at 1291. The Court held that where an offense is punishable by no more than six months in prison, it is presumed to be petty. Id. at 543 , 109 S.Ct. at 1293 . However, a defendant may rebut this presumption “if he can demonstrate that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a ‘serious’ one.” Id.

The majority invokes the Blanton Court’s language (and particularly, the word “clearly”) to support its proposition that a fine will virtually never be serious enough to implicate the right to a jury trial. Supra, at 1377-78. However, the majority pays no heed to the method by which the unanimous Blanton Court went on to determine whether the Nevada law’s $1,000 fine clearly reflected a legislative determination of seriousness. In keeping with its long line of precedent, the Court compared the $1,000 fine against objective criteria — the laws and practices in the Nation-reasoning that “[a]s for the possible $1,000 fine, it is well below the $5,000 level set by Congress in its most recent definition of a ‘petty’ offense ... .and petitioners do not suggest that this congressional figure is out of step with state practice for offenses carrying prison sentences’ of six months or less.” Id. at 544-45 , 109 S.Ct. at 1293-94 , 109 S.Ct. at 1294 . As the Court noted, “[w]e have frequently looked to the federal classification scheme in determining when a jury trial must be provided,” and “we [have] looked to state practice in our past decisions, ... chiefly to determine whether there was a nationwide consensus on the potential term of imprisonment or amount of fine that triggered a jury trial_” Id. at 545 n. 11, 109 S.Ct. at 1294 n. 11, 489 U.S. 546 , 109 S.Ct. 1294 n. 11 , 103 L.Ed.2d 559 . Thus, Blanton reiterates that we are to look to the congressional definition of “petty offense,” as well as to the prevailing practice of the state legislatures concerning what penalties correlate with seriousness, in evaluating whether a particular fine clearly evinces a legislative determination of seriousness.

Lastly, in United States v. Nachtigal, the Court addressed the seriousness of 36 C.F.R. §§ 4.23 (a)(1)-(2) (1992), a federal regulation that prohibited operation of a motor vehicle in a national park while under the influence of alcohol. 507 U.S. 1, 2 , 113 S.Ct. 1072, 1072 , 122 L.Ed.2d 374 (1993). The. offense was designated as a class B misdemeanor under the federal classification system and, therefore, was subject to a maximum authorized penalty of up to both six months in prison and a $5,000 fine. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3581 (b)(7), 3571(b)(6), (e)). As an alternative to imprisonment, a sentencing court might instead impose a term of probation not to exceed five years, which could be subject to any number of discretionary condi *1384 tions. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561 (a)(3), (c)(2), 3563(b)). The Supreme Court held, in a short per curiam opinion, that this offense was petty for purposes of the right to a jury trial. Id. at 4 , 113 S.Ct. at 1074 .

However, Nachtigal was only, as described by the Court, “a relatively routine application of the rule announced in Blanton. ” Id. Although the short Nachtigal opinion never expressly refers to the congressional definition of a “petty offense,” its holding represents merely a straightforward application of the analysis in Blanton . In determining whether a' $1,000 fine clearly evidenced a legislative determination of seriousness, the Blanton Court looked.to the congressional definition of a petty offense, which includes “a Class B misdemeanor, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction” with a fine no greater than $5,000. 18 U.S.C. § 19 . The offense in Nachtigal was in fact a class B misdemeanor, and therefore its various penalties (prison or probation, and a $5,000 fine) fell squarely within Congress’s judgment of what is petty. Thus, it is clear that the penalties attached to the offense in Nachtigal did not manifest a legislative judgment of seriousness. The Court was able to render an opinion without briefs or oral, argument because Nachtigal was, under the reasoning of Blanton , an easy case.

The majority attempts to make more of Nachtigal than it is. First, the majority notes how the Nachtigal Court “attached no significance” to the $5,000 fine, even though it was five times the $1,000 maximum fine in Blanton. Swpra, at 1378. The majority interprets such nonchalance as an indication that a $5,000 fine is not even close to being serious. However, as explained above, there is no incongruity between the fact that Nachtigal was a “relatively routine application of the rule announced in Blanton” and the fact that the case before us is not. The penalties for the crime we consider today, unlike those in Nachtigal, fall without the congressional definition of a “petty offense.” And the mere fact that a $5,000 fine, which is much greater than a $1,000 fine, is considered petty does not necessitate the conclusion that a $10,000 fine, which is much greater than a $5,000 fine, be similarly treated— especially when Congress has clearly expressed its judgment that a $5,000 fine is petty and a $10,000 fine is not. One might question whether a $10,000 fine is substantially greater than a $5,000 one, but the Supreme Court has explained that drawing the line between petty and serious “cannot be wholly satisfactory, for it requires attaching different consequences to events which, when they lie near the line, actually differ very little.” Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161 , 88 S.Ct. at 1453 . This is precisely why the Supreme Court has instructed us to look to the legislatures for guidance in drawing it.

Secondly, the majority points to admittedly strong language in Nachtigal that a fine “cannot approximate in severity the loss of liberty that a prison term entails.” Supra, at 1378 (quoting Nachtigal, 507 U.S. at 4 , 113 S.Ct. at 1074 ). At first blush, this language seems to imply that a fine could never be serious enough to tip the scale from petty to serious. However, this language is a direct quote from Blanton , and the Court in Blan-ton did not intend to hold that a heavy fine could not be serious enough to implicate the right to a jury trial. 489 U.S. at 542-43, 109 S.Ct. at 1292-93. Rather, the Blanton Court indicated that a fine could in fact evidence a legislative determination of seriousness, and it looked to the congressional definition of “petty offense” in determining whether the $1,000 fine at issue did so. Id. at 544-45 ,109 S.Ct. at 1294. The fact that the average defendant’s willingness to pay to stay out of prison is extremely high does not mean that a heavy fine can never denote fa serious offense. The majority itself admits that a fine could potentially be of such severity as to require a jury trial (postulating $1 million), but it refuses to draw a line. Supra, at 1379. The Supreme Court has instructed, however, that “[t]he judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that of a legislature,” and Congress has already indicated its judgment as to where the line should be drawn by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 19 .

Thirdly, the majority makes much of the penalties that were considered petty in Nachtigal, maintaining that because those penalties were more serious than the ones we address today, we must find a nonviolent *1385 first violation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act to be petty.- Supra, at 1378-79. The majority focuses on the fact that as a substitute for imprisonment the defendant could have been sentenced to five years’ probation, which at the sentencing court’s discretion might be subject to one or more of several conditions set out at 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (b), including having to spend the five-year probation period residing at a halfway house. The majority reasons that “being required to live in a [community] correctional facility for five years plus having to pay a fine of $5,000 — a combination of sanctions expressly authorized by the regulation upheld in Nachtigal — is a more severe punishment than imprisonment for six months plus a fine of $10,000.” Supra, at 1379. However, this comparison is faulty; it rests upon the assumption that five years’ probation (even in a halfway house) is a more severe penalty than six months in prison — an assumption that was completely rejected by the Court in Nachtigal, 507 U.S. at 4 , 113 S.Ct. at 1074 . According to the Supreme Court, five years’ probation and a $5,000 fine (found petty in Nachtigal) is a lesser penalty than six months in prison and a $5,000 fine (also found petty in Nachtigal ). Id. Six months in prison and a $10,000 fine (the maximum authorized penalty we address today) is therefore a greater penalty than any of the possible penalty combinations found petty in Nachtigal.

In sum, although the Court in Nachtigal made quick work of the facts before it, nothing in that per curiam opinion indicates the Supreme Court’s intention to discard decades of precedent instructing us to look to the legislatures in determining whether a particular maximum penalty represents a legislative judgment of seriousness.

II

Relying on Congress’s definition of “petty offense” as an indication of what penalties equate with seriousness is particularly appropriate in this case. First of all, the defendants are charged with a federal crime. Given that Congress authorized the maximum penalties for a nonviolent first violation of the Act, an expression of Congress’s judgment concerning what penalties are serious enough to warrant a jury trial is extremely probative of whether Congress believes that such a nonviolent first violation is a serious crime.

Additionally, a review of the legislative history attendant to 18 U.S.C. § 19 makes clear that the statutory definition of “petty offense” is direct evidence of Congress’s judgment that a nonviolent first violation of the Act is a serious crime for purposes of the constitutional right to a jury trial.. First, the legislative history indicates that Congress is aware of the Supreme Court’s historical practice of looking to the congressional definition of “petty offense” in determining whether an offense’s penalty indicates a legislative determination of seriousness. 6 Secondly, the legislative history shows that Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 19 for the sole purpose of expressing its legislative judgment concerning what penalties indicate a • crime serious enough to merit a jury trial, 7 *1386 and that Congress has amended the definition to keep it current as a measure of which crimes are petty and which are serious. 8 Finally, and most importantly, the legislative history makes clear that Congress considers a crime punishable by up to six months in prison and a $10,000 fine to be a serious one, deserving of the right to a jury trial. 9

Now, I do not suggest that anything in 18 U.S.C. § 19 creates a statutory right to a jury trial. See United States v. Kozel, 908 F.2d 205, 207 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1089 , 111 S.Ct. 969 , 112 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1991). Nor do I contend that Congress’s pronouncements absolutely dictate the boundaries of the constitutional right to a trial by jury. A legislature cannot by statutory enactment define the limits of a constitutional right, and both the Supreme Court and Congress have noted that 18 U.S.C. § 19 has no magical properties, no “talismanic significance.” See Muniz, 422 U.S. at 477 , 95 S.Ct. at 2190 ; H.R. Rep. No. 98-906 at 19-20.

But although 18 U.S.C. § 19 does not absolutely control the determination of what *1387 crimes are petty, it certainly must inform our decision. See Kozel, 908 F.2d at 207 . As discussed above, relevant Supreme Court precedent instructs us to look to the judgment of the legislatures for guidance in determining whether a crime’s authorized penalties clearly represent a legislative determination of seriousness. Where Congress has with its left hand expressly stated its judgment that a crime punishable by six months in prison and a fine greater than $5,000 is serious, and has with its right hand enacted a law punishable by up to six months in prison and a $10,000 fine, there is eleai’ evidence that Congress considers that crime to be serious. To consider such a crime petty and deny defendants charged with it the right to trial by jury, as the majority does today, is to contravene Supreme Court instruction by substituting a judicial determination as to seriousness for that of Congress. I would therefore vacate the defendants’ convictions and remand for a retrial by jury.

. Note that "when the legislature has not expressed a judgment as to the seriousness of an offense by fixing a maximum penalty” (such as for criminal contempt), the Court “look[s] to the penalty actually imposed as the best evidence of the seriousness of the offense.” Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 , 88 S.Ct. 1477, 1487 , 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968).

. Until 1984, Congress defined “petty offense” in 18 U.S.C. § 1 as "[a]ny misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or both....” Today, 18 U.S.C. § 19 defines “petty offense" as "a Class B misdemeanor, a Class C misdemeanor, -or an infraction, for which the maximum fine is no greater than the amount set forth for such an offense in section 3571(b)(6) or (7) in the case of an individual or section 3571(c)(6) or (7) in the case of an organization.” Read together with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559 (a)(7)-(9), 3571(b)(6)-(7), (c)(6)-(7), this definition translates into any offense for which the maximum penalty does not exceed six months in prison, a fine of $5,000 for an individual or $10,000 for an organization, or both. Iri lieu of incarceration, a petty offender may be sentenced to up to a five-year period of probation, which may be subject to a number of discretionary conditions, and which if violated may result in full resentencing. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 , 3561-66.

. In Baldwin , the Supreme Court referenced information concerning the prevailing jury trial practice among the states by citing to a survey in the American Bar Ass'n Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Advisory Committee on the Criminal Trial, Trial by Jury 20-23 (Approved Draft 1968). 399 U.S. at 72 n. 18, 90 S.Ct. at 1890 n. 18. The project’s report concluded that most state practices were in keeping with the then-federal standard, 18 U.S.C. § 1 , and recommended that that standard "should be the upper limit upon the definition of ‘petty offense.’ " Id.

Today, the ABA advocates a much more lenient standard: "Jury trial should be available to a party, including the state, in criminal prosecutions in which confinement in jail or prison may be imposed.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury, Standard 15-1.1 (Right to jury trial), at 121 (3d ed.1996). The commentary to this standard notes:

The states vary in providing a state right to jury trial in criminal cases, whether the right is constitutional or statutory. Many states follow the federal rule by refusing trial by jury to a defendant charged with those minor crimes defined in the state as ‘petty offenses' or ‘infractions.’ Other states, following the earlier lead of the ABA standards, provide for trial by jury in all cases where there is potential imprisonment. Some states have constitutional provisions for nonjury trials of petty offenses in the first instance,' with right to de novo jury trial on appeal.

Id. at 123 (footnotes omitted). It is also worth noting that even in those states that follow the federal rule, many statutorily define "petty offenses” or "infractions” more restrictively than has Congress. See, e.g.,- Cal. Penal Code §§ 19.6 , 19.8 (no jury trial for "infraction,” which is defined as an offense for which there can be no imprisonment and for which the maximum fine does not exceed $250); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-109 (1)-(2) (defining "petty offense,” for which there is no jury trial unless the defendant pays a jury fee, as any crime for which the penalty does not exceed six months in prison, a $500 fine, or both).

. At the time Frank was decided, probation was governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-55 . These statutes were subsequently' repealed, and probation is today addressed at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561-66 .

. See Douglass v. First National Realty Corp., 543 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C.Cir.1976); United States v. Professional Air, Traffic Controllers Org., 678 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1982); United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co., Inc., 681 F.2d 934 , 936 n. 2 (4th Cir.1982); Girard v. Goins, 575 F.2d 160, 164-65 (8th Cir.1978); United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 278-80 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir.1980). The Fifth Circuit initially interpreted Muniz as a statement by the Supreme Court that only imprisonment and not a fine was important in determining whether a crime was serious or petty, see Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201 , 1216 n. 30 (5th Cir.1988); however, since the Supreme Court decided Blanton , the Fifth Circuit has indicated that it would look to the congressional definition of “petty offense" in determining whether a heavy fine evidenced a legislative determination of seriousness. See United States v. Time, 21 F.3d 635, 642 (5th Cir.1994).

. When Congress amended 18 U.S.C. § 1 in 1984, Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, § 8, 98 Stat. at 3138, it explained:

There is, as a matter of law, no right to a jury trial for a petty offense.... Since the Constitution does not explicitly define what is petly, the courts have had to look elsewhere to determine whether a punishment ... is petty or serious. In the interests of uniformity, objectivity, and practical judicial administration, the courts have therefore looked to 18 U.S.C. § 1 as the monetary measure of a serious offense for the purposes of the right to jury trial.

H.R. Rep. No. 98-906 at 19-20 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

In enacting 18 U.S.C. § 19 to supersede 18 U.S.C. § 1 , Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, Pub.L. No. 100-185, § 4 (a), 101 Stat. 1279 , 1279, Congress similarly noted:

In Frank v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to trial by jury does not apply to petty offenses.... The Supreme Court has indicated that 18 U.S.C. 1 is a measure of the seriousness of an offense for purposes of the right to trial by jury.

H.R. Rep. No. 100-390, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1987), reprinted at 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2140-41 (footnotes oitiitted).

. When 18 U.S.C. § 19 was enacted in 1987, Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, § 4(a), 101 Stat. at 1279, the House Report explains:

Section 4(a) of the bill amends chapter 1 of title 18, United States Code, to carry forward the definition of "petty offense.” ... The Sen *1386 tencing Reform Act .... repeals 18 U.S.C. 1 as of November 1, 1987. That repeal, together with other provisions enacted by the Sentencing Reform Act that set fine levels for misdemeanors at $25,000 for an individual and $100,000 for an organization, raises questions about when a jury trial is required for persons charged with minor misdemeanors_ Section 4(a) of the bill adds a new section (section 19) to 18 U.S.C. ch. 1 that carnes forward the current definition of petty offense.

H.R. Rep. No. 100-390 at 4—5 (footnotes omitted).

Similarly, when 18 U.S.C. § 19 was amended in 1988, Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Title VII, § 7089, 102 Stat. 4187 , 4409, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted that "[t]he amendment is needed to carry forward fully the concept of petty offense for purposes of the exception to the constitutional right to trial by jury," Section Analysis of Judiciary Committee Issues in H.R. 5210, § 7089, 134 Cong. Rec. 32692, 32705 (Nov. 10, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Biden, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee), and the House Judiciary Committee noted that "[t]he significance of the label 'petty offense' is that the constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply if a person is charged with a petty offense,” Section-by-Section Analysis of Title VII, Subtitle B, Minor and Technical Criminal Law Amendments, § 7089, 134 Cong. Rec. 33296, 33301 (Oct. 21, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Conyers, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Committee).

. In 1984, Congress amended the maximum fine level in 18 U.S.C. § 1 from $500 to $5,000 for an individual and $10,000 for an organization. Criminal Fine Enforcement Act of 1984, § 8, 98 Stat. at 3138. The House Report explains the purpose of the amendment:

The amount presently used in the definition of petty offense, $500, was set by Congress in 1930. The Committee is raising this figure to account for inflation. If a $500 fine for an individual was ‘‘petty” in 1930, when the per capita disposable income was $599, then $5,000 is “petty” today, when the per capita disposable income is $9,969.

H.R. Rep. No. 98-906 at 19 (citations omitted). Note that if the 1984 $5,000 figure is adjusted for inflation up to the present day, it reflects a legislative judgment that a fine levied on an individual is serious if it is greater than $7,317.34, an amount that is still much less than the $10,000 fine that could have, been imposed upon the defendants in this case. (Inflation figures taken from the 1996 World Almanac, with inflation calculated as the annual percentage change in the overall Consumer Price Index).

. When Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 19 in 1987, it defined "petty offense” as "a Class B misdemeanor, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction....” Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, § 4(a), 101 Stat. at 1279. The goal of this enactment was to carry forward the definition of "petty offense" as any crime for which a defendant could be punished by up to six months in prison, a $5,000 fine for an individual or a $10,000 fine for an organization, or both. H.R. Rep. No. 100-390 at 5. However, phrasing the definition of petty offenses only by reference to the federal classification system left open a few instances in which a Class B misdemeanor might be subject to fines higher than the $5,000 and $10,000 limits:

The 1987 amendments ... did not accomplish [their] goal fully because the definition of petty offense did not specifically include a maximum fine level.... |T]he 1987 definition of petty offense inadvertently included a class of offenses which may be petty for constitutional purposes even though they are Class B or C misdemeanors ...: offenses punishable by six months’ or less imprisonment which, by the terms of the statutes setting forth such offenses, carry a higher maximum fine than the $5,000 and $10,000 levels....

Section Analysis of Judiciary Committee Issues in H.R. 5210, 134 Cong. Rec. at 32705. In response to this problem, Congress amended the definition in 1988 to make clear its judgment that a fine above $5,000 for an individual or $10,000 for an organization renders an offense serious: "Section 7089(a) modifies the definition of petty offense in 18 U.S.C. § 19 by providing that a petty offense cannot call for a fine in excess of $5,000 for an individual and $10,000 for an organization_” Sect ion-by-Section Analysis of Title VII, Subtitle B, 134 Cong. Rec. at 33301.