suggesting that if Evans is not overruled the court should require that “trial courts also ask each member of the venire whether he would ‘give special credence and weight to the word of [the criminal defendant] simply because of the fact that he [is the criminal defendant],’ and excuse for cause anyone who answers affirmatively, as Evans requires that we excuse those who say that they would give more weight to officers of the law than to criminal defendants”
How later courts described this case
- suggesting that if Evans is not overruled the court should require that “trial courts also ask each member of the venire whether he would ‘give special credence and weight to the word of [the criminal defendant] simply because of the fact that he [is the criminal defendant],’ and excuse for cause anyone who answers affirmatively, as Evans requires that we excuse those who say that they would give more weight to officers of the law than to criminal defendants”
- “Decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are committed to the sound discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LUTTIG, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I believe that Judge Williams’ opinion for the court properly interprets our decision in United States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800 (4th Cir.1990), as limited to the very narrow facts presented in that case, and correctly holds that the facts with which we are confronted are sufficiently different from those in Evans that that decision is not controlling here. Among other distinguishing factors, the court specifically instructed the jury in this case, unlike in Evans , that the “defendant’s testimony is to be judged in the same way as that of any other witness,” see J.A. at 238 — that is, in the same way as the testimony of the two correctional officers who testified against Lancaster and Vanlierop. Additionally, there were other witnesses to the assault who could have been called to testify, as well as independent evidence of the crime beyond the testimony of the persons involved.
If the opportunity arose, however, I would overrule Evans — or at the very least require that trial courts also ask each member of the venire whether he would “give special credence and weight to the word of [the criminal defendant] simply because of the fact that he [is the criminal defendant],” see id. at 806 , and excuse for cause anyone who answers affirmatively, as Evans requires that we excuse those who say that they would give more weight to officers of the law than to criminal defendants. At a minimum, we should be evenhanded in our pursuit of rules assertedly designed to ensure evenhandedness.