stating that “[i]f the evidence put forth by the plaintiff to establish the prima facie case and to rebut the employer’s reason is not substantial, a jury cannot reasonably infer discriminatory intent ...and “[w]hen a plaintiff has offered pretextual evidence that allows a factfinder to reject the defendant’s proffered reasons and infer discrimination, other circuits have been unwilling to upset a jury verdict for the plaintiff’
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[i]f the evidence put forth by the plaintiff to establish the prima facie case and to rebut the employer’s reason is not substantial, a jury cannot reasonably infer discriminatory intent ...and “[w]hen a plaintiff has offered pretextual evidence that allows a factfinder to reject the defendant’s proffered reasons and infer discrimination, other circuits have been unwilling to upset a jury verdict for the plaintiff’
- holding that a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only if she “(1) creates a fact issue as to whether each of the employer’s stated reasons was what actually motivated the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that age was a determinative factor in the actions of which plaintiff complains.” (emphasis added)
- holding that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of discrimination when the plaintiff demonstrated that the employer's proffered explanation, poor performance, was pretextual because his poor results were due to the company's prices and a poor customer base
- holding that to avoid summary judgment in an ADEA action, an employee must present evidence that both: (1) rebuts the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason, and (2) creates an inference that age was a determinative factor in the challenged employment decision
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000)
75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133
The opinion
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge,
concurring and dissenting specially:
Like Judge DeMoss, I concur in the en banc majority’s articulation of the law applicable to this case.
Like Judge DeMoss, I do not agree that the rules of law were correctly applied to the facts before us, and I therefore concur in Part I of his dissent.