Opinion

United States v. David W. Lanier

  • 73 F.3d 1380
  • 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 757
  • 1996 WL 21177
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Jan 23, 1996
Status
Published
Author
Keith
On the bench
Merritt, Keith, Kennedy, Martin, Jones, Wellford, Nelson, Ryan, Boggs, Norris, Suhrheinrich, Siler, Batchelder, Daughtrey, Moore
Cited by
57 cases

Vacated on other grounds by United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)

concluding that “sexual assaults may not be prosecuted as violations of a constitutional substantive due process right to bodily integrity” under 18 U.S.C. § 242

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that “sexual assaults may not be prosecuted as violations of a constitutional substantive due process right to bodily integrity” under 18 U.S.C. § 242
  • in holding that “sexual assaults may not be prosecuted as violations of a constitutional substantive due process right to bodily integrity,” the court noted that “a sexual assault raising an equal protection gender discrimination claim may present an entirely different case”
  • “One of the cardinal principles that guides . . . appellate review . . . is to insure that outrage at the egregiousness of the complained of conduct has not intruded upon the application of neutral principles of law.”
  • when applying the rule of lenity courts should not go to 4 extreme lengths to characterize criminal statutes as ambiguous when they can be read as relatively well-defined

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

KEITH, Circuit Judge,

joining in the dissent.

Today, the majority, in an opinion thoroughly lacking in indignation for the outrageous acts perpetrated by Judge Lanier, reverses Lanier’s conviction under 42 U.S.C. § 242 on the grounds that § 242 does not expressly criminalize sexual assault committed against court employees and litigants by a state judge. I dissent for the reasons so eloquently stated by Judge Daughtrey. However, because I am deeply disturbed by not only the conclusion the majority has reached, but also by the insensitive tone and lack of compassion permeating the majority opinion, I add this additional comment.

In one of the most deplorable cases to come before this Court since I have served on the federal bench, the majority has done the public a great disservice. It is clear that *1400 in a society that has historically oppressed women, abuse of power by a judicial officer appointed or elected to ensure fairness is truly devastating. It is undeniable that Judge Lanier wielded tremendous power and influence in the Dyersburg, Tennessee community. His power over his victims was augmented by his position as employer to some and in the case of Vivian Archie, by his control over the custody arrangements of Archie’s child. The shocking sexual assaults, forced sex acts and threats with which Judge Lanier victimized women are reprehensible. In my view, Judge Lanier’s loathsome acts, combined with the fact that he was found to have sexually assaulted one of his victims while wearing his judicial robes, are more than enough to satisfy the most stringent interpretations for prosecution under § 242.

However, incredibly, the majority ignores the facts and the law to hold that § 242 does not criminalize such behavior. In order to reach its preposterous result, the majority not only dismisses clearly established law protecting each person’s right to be free from interference with bodily integrity that shocks the conscience, but also ignores the outrageous nature of Judge Lanier’s actions. Besides glossing over the horrendous acts for which Lanier was convicted, the majority, in cavalier fashion, also devalues the fact that Lanier was tried and found guilty by a jury of his peers and was later sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. In consideration of the above, the majority’s holding does nothing less than render Judge Lanier’s egregious acts acceptable.

As judges, we are guardians and trustees of the justice system. At a time when lack of public confidence in the justice system is at it greatest, the majority reaches a result that is guaranteed to further lower the public’s trust. In a country where the average person may go to jail for stealing a loaf of bread, the majority releases back into the community a judge who has used the power of his office and his position in society to repeatedly victimize women. If federal law is not to protect women from being forced to sexually gratify a judicial officer at his request under threats of losing their jobs or children, whom is it to protect? Certainly, it was not intended to protect judges who commit such outrageous acts. No person is above the law, especially a judge. It is my firm belief that for people to have faith in our system of justice, the grossly offensive acts Judge La-nier committed against women at his mercy cannot be sanctioned by this Court. Sadly, the majority seems to have forgotten that while law is a means, “[jjustice is the end.” See The FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 1 In this ease, law has not served the ends of justice.

Accordingly, I join in Judge Daughtrey’s dissent.

. In Federalist paper No. 51, James Madison wrote: “Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.”

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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