finding that there was sufficient evidence that the superintendent was personally responsible for denial of access to courts where the “continued denial of scribe materials was a policy of Duckworth’s, at least to the level of ‘turning a blind eye’”
How later courts described this case
- finding that there was sufficient evidence that the superintendent was personally responsible for denial of access to courts where the “continued denial of scribe materials was a policy of Duckworth’s, at least to the level of ‘turning a blind eye’”
- explaining that supervisors are not personally involved in the constitutional deprivation unless they knew about the conduct and facilitated, approved, or condoned it, or otherwise turned a blind eye
- stating that “[t]o recover damages under [Section] 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”
- holding that a supervisor will be held liable for a subordinate’s misconduct if the supervisor directs, consents to, or turns a blind eye to the misconduct
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Ripp v. Nickel, 838 F. Supp. 2d 861 (2012)
However, defendant says that Gentry is distinguishable because, in this case, all the materials plaintiff needs are available from the prison canteen.
The opinion
*562 MANION, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
My colleagues have found that it was inappropriate on these facts to have granted summary judgment against Kenneth Gentry on his access to courts claim. And it may be true that Gentry’s rights were violated if he can show that he was denied certain scribe materials that were necessary to allow him to conform to the procedural rules of the Indiana Court of Appeals. But he cannot win below and should not win here for one very simple reason. He sued the wrong defendant.
Jack Duckworth, Superintendent of the Indiana State Reformatory, is the only defendant here. Gentry requested leave of the district court to add additional defendants, but that motion was denied. And as the court notes, that issue was forfeited when not timely appealed. He must therefore show that a reasonable juror could have found from the facts in the record that Duckworth himself was guilty of the conduct alleged in this case. Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir.1988); Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360, 369 (7th Cir.1985). There is no such evidence here. The summary judgment record indicates only that Gentry wrote letters to Duckworth which were not answered. There is therefore no indication that Duck-worth even knew about the alleged deprivation of materials, let alone directed others to deny the materials or otherwise facilitated the denial. See Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.1984) (mere fact that supervisors were informed of harassment did not establish involvement); Hadley v. Peters, 841 F.Supp. 850, 860 (C.D.Ill.1994) (letters sent to supervisory defendants insufficient to create liability).
My colleagues effectively excuse Gentry from his duty to present such facts. As the court points out, we will sometimes construe pro se pleadings broadly in favor of litigants without counsel. But we must not completely excuse such litigants from their obligation to present facts in support of their claims. See Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 283 (7th Cir.1992). The only concession we grant to pro se litigants in a summary judgment situation is the requirement that such parties receive adequate notice of their duty to respond to the motion with facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 285 (all pro se litigants entitled to notice of the consequences of failing to respond to a summary judgment motion). Such notice was given here.
The conclusion to this case is therefore simple. Gentry failed to present facts from which a jury could conclude that Duckworth was personally responsible for the deprivations in this ease. On that basis the district court’s grant of summary judgment against him should be affirmed.