Opinion

In Re Oliver L. North (Clair E. George Fee Application)

  • 62 F.3d 1434
  • 314 U.S. App. D.C. 102
  • 1994 WL 838107
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
Oct 21, 1994
Status
Published
Author
Sneed
On the bench
Butzner, Per Curiam, Sentelle, Sneed
Cited by
41 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.9%

concluding that the United States Supreme Court’s articulation of the pardoning power in Garland was uncontrolling dictum and further holding that the Burdick decision implicitly rejected the overly broad position

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that the United States Supreme Court’s articulation of the pardoning power in Garland was uncontrolling dictum and further holding that the Burdick decision implicitly rejected the overly broad position
  • noting that Garland did not rest its judgment on the theory that the pardon at issue had blotted out Garland's guilt
  • stating that Garland’s “expansive view of the effect of a pardon turned out to be dictum” and noting that “Garland’s dictum was implicitly rejected in Burdick” (citation omitted)
  • explaining that contrary language in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866), was dicta

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

SNEED, Senior Circuit Judge,

dissenting:

The majority admirably sets forth the reasons for deciding this matter against George. Admittedly, the issue is a close one. However, I approach it from a different perspective and would reach a different result.

At its heart, the issue is whether the statutory requirement of “no indictment” should be considered as an unalterable part of the statute or as a disability subject to removal as a consequence of a Presidential pardon.

A straightforward analysis will support the former view. The majority has provided it. George was indicted. The statute provides no fees for those indicted. A pardon cannot *1439 change the law. It cannot appropriate money. Thus, George cannot recover fees.

Straight as it may seem, I cannot follow the majority’s path. I view the statute as an authorization by Congress to pay the legal fees of those who are “subject[s]” of an independent counsel’s investigation, conditioned on there being no indictment of the “subject.” 28 U.S.C. § 593 (f)(1). Under the Act, therefore, an indictment imposes a legal disability barring suit by those indicted. A Presidential pardon removes the disabilities attendant upon indictment or conviction of an offense. I would hold, therefore, that George’s receipt of a pardon eclipses his indictment and removes, with respect to a portion of the fees, the attendant disability.

I.

Article II, section 2 of the Constitution gives the President “Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.” U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl. 1. In Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 , 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866), the Supreme Court observed that “[i]f granted before conviction, [a pardon] prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores [the person pardoned] to all his civil rights.” These rights include the right to testify in court, see Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 453-54 , 12 S.Ct. 292, 293-94 , 35 L.Ed. 1077 (1892), and the right to vote, see Samuel Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 Harv.L.Rev. 647, 654 & n. 25 (1915) (collecting cases).

The issue here is whether a full pardon restores George’s right to sue under the Act by removing the “no indictment” bar. Like the majority, I rely on a “Reconstruction” case — albeit a different one, United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 , 19 L.Ed. 788 (1869). Padelford arose under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, which provided that property captured or found abandoned during the Civil War would be sold, with the proceeds set aside by the Treasury. Id. at 538 . The original property owner could recoup the sale proceeds upon proof that “he never gave any aid or comfort to the rebellion.” Id. The claimant in Padelford sought reimbursement for cotton ■ he had stored in Savannah at the time that city was captured by Union forces. Id. at 539 .

The Court found that Padelford had indeed aided the rebellion, by acting as a surety for certain Confederate military personnel. Id. The Court also found, however, that Padel-ford had subsequently accepted a Presidential offer of amnesty. Id. at 539, 542 . Citing Garland, the Court held that Padelford “was purged of whatever offence against the laws of the United States he had committed by [aiding the Confederacy], and relieved from any penalty which he might have incurred.” Id. at 543 . Alternatively, as a matter of statutory construction, the Court found that the law implicitly made “the proof of pardon a complete substitute for proof that [a claimant] gave no aid or comfort to the rebellion.” Id. In any event* the Court found that Pa-delford was entitled to reimbursement ■ despite the statutory bar. See id.

Here, as in Padelford , Congress has established a scheme for reimbursing certain parties to a conflict. With the passage of over a century, the battlefield and combatants are undeniably different, but the underlying statutory themes of reparation and remedy are similar. Here, Congress has also established a legal disability which bars suit by “subjects” indicted of a federal offense. Its function is similar to the legal bar that faced Confederate sympathizers in Padelford .

As- the Padelford Court held, a pardon wipes clean such legal impediments. Thus, I would hold that the pardon received by George removes the indictment bar to fee recovery under the Act. It should restore his right to sue under the Act. To do less improperly diminishes the Presidential power to pardon. The right to sue is at least as fundamental as the right to testify in court, and we have afforded the latter right to pardoned criminals for over a century. See Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. at 453-54 , 12 S.Ct. at 293-94 (pardon restores convicted criminal’s right to testify); see also Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 43-44 , 18 L.Ed. 745 (1868) (including “free access to *1440 ... the courts of justice in the several States” among the privileges and immunities of citizenship).

The power of the President to pardon, moreover, is quite broad. “[T]he pardoning power is an enumerated power of the Constitution and ... its limitations, if any, must be found in the Constitution itself.” Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267 , 95 S.Ct. 379, 385 , 42 L.Ed.2d 430 (1974); see also United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 , 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871) (“[T]he legislature cannot’change the effect of ... a pardon any more than the executive can change a law.”). The Act with which we are concerned makes no attempt to limit Presidential pardons. Given the serious constitutional issues such a limitation would present, I would not construe the Act so as to infer one. See Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 147, 153 , 21 L.Ed. 426 (1872) (interpreting Captured and Abandoned Property Act to allow recovery by aliens who had been pardoned for aiding the Confederacy): “It is not to be supposed that Congress intended by the general language of the act to encroach upon any of the prerogatives of the President, and especially that benign prerogative of mercy which lies in the pardoning power.”

II.

The majority relies on Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 149, 153-54, 24 L.Ed. 442 (1877). As the majority points out, there the Supreme Court refused to return property, previously forfeited to the United States upon the original owner’s treason, after that party’s receipt of a pardon. Id. Here,- unlike Knote , no formal court judgment has divested George of his “title” to the fee award. No property of George became vested in the Treasury of the United States. Cf. Knote, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) at 149. He has merely incurred a debt to- his attorneys for which, as in Padelford , the government has established a scheme of reparation. No such scheme applied in Knote . There the claimant sought to recover on an implied contract basis. See Knote, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) at 157. For these reasons, I would find Padelford to be the controlling authority.

The majority also relies on the constitutional principle that a pardon cannot reach monies in the United States Treasury without a congressional appropriation. The short answer is that the, Act constitutes just such an appropriation. That again brings us to Padelford , which expressly rejected the majority’s argument:

[I]t has been suggested that [Padelford’s] property was captured in fact if not lawfully; and that the proceeds having been paid into .the Treasury ..., the petitioner is without remedy ... unless proof is made he gave no aid or comfort to the rebellion. The suggestion is ingenious, but we do not think it sound. The sufficient answer to it is that after the pardon no offense connected with the rebellion can be imputed to him.... [T]he law makes the proof of pardon a complete substitute for proof he gave no aid or comfort to the rebellion.

Padelford , 76 U.S. (9 Wall) at 543.

The majority also observes that waivers of sovereign immunity, like the Act, are to be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. It does not follow, however, that a waiver of sovereign immunity can be construed to limit the effect of a Presidential pardon. The Supreme Court, in a case following Padel-ford, expressly rejected a sovereign immunity defense. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 144 , 20 L.Ed. 519 (1871): “It was urged in argument that the right to sue the government ... is a matter of favor; but this seems not entirely accurate. It is as much the duty of the government as of individuals to fulfil its obligations.”

III.

In light of its holding, the majority does not address the remaining requirements of the Act. I shall briefly discuss one. The Act authorizes this court to award reimbursement only for reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred during the related independent counsel investigation. 28 U.S.C. § 593 (f)(1). For any given applicant, the investigation terminates with the return of an indictment with respect to that applicant. In re Nofziger (Mark A. Bragg), 956 F.2d 287, 289 (D.C.Cir.1992) (per curiam). We therefore lack jurisdiction to award reimbursement for *1441 fees incurred in the post-indictment phase, such as pre-trial and trial fees.; Id. (denying petition for post-indictment fees, even though the related indictment was invalid).

I would hold that George, despite his pardon, is not entitled to post-indictment attorneys’ fees. The President’s power to pardon, as broad as it is, can change no law enacted by Congress. While it removes the legal bar to his suit, it neither alters the historical chronology of the investigation nor otherwise changes the language or scope of the Act. While it unlocks the statutory box, it does not alter the contents. ' This, then, is the true operative force of Knote .

This would preclude recovery of the lion’s share of the amount sought by George’s petition. Based on his supporting documentation, George incurred only $35,974.05 in fees and expenses prior to his indictment. 1 I would therefore hold that we lack statutory authority to award the remaining $1,261,-976.13. Thus, although George’s pardon enables him to surmount the “no indictment” requirement, that fact represents only a limited victory.

IV.

Finally, I should address the policy issues to the extent they are severable from the legal ones. Would my approach impose a substantial burden on the Treasury? I think not; Presidential pardons under the Ethics in Government Act will be infrequent, I believe. Moreover, the relief afforded, while helpful, would be-small. Lastly, there, appears to me to be no reasonable ground to object to the limited reach of the pardon power my logic embraces. I am reasonably sure, but not certain, of course, that George served his country honorably, as that term must be understood when evaluating intelligence agents. The then-President obviously thought so. Intelligence work demands strong loyalty to the Nation, as well as discreet silence and sometimes greatly diminished candor. Agents sometimes cross the line into the field of partial truth and falsehood, even before Congress. We cannot condone such crossings, but when the President extends his mercy, neither should we deny the petitioner our bit of compassion.

V.

The majority views the “no indictment” requirement as an integral part of the Act, and thus does not allow George any recovery. I view the same requirement as a legal disability attached to the Act, and would allow George some recovery — albeit one limited by the Act’s “during the investigation” element. The parallax caused by our different points of view is not great, but it is enough to prevent my joining in the majority’s opinion or its result. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

. I calculate this amount as follows: With regards to legal fees, George's supporting documentation describes September 6, 1991, as the “indictment day." I consider all fees incurred prior to that date to be pre-indictment fees. George's petition does not allocate fees incurred on the day of his indictment between pre- and post-indictment fees. In the interest of simplicity, I allocate one-half of that day’s fees to .each.

With regard to out-of-pocket expenses, George’s petition lists aggregate expenses by month without prorating by day. I consider all expenses for the months of July and August 1991 to be pre-indictment expenses. As for expenses incurred during September 1991, the month of indictment, I prorate these expenses evenly throughout the month.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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