explaining that the FAR “specifically excludes only undisputed routine requests for payment from the category of written demands for payment that satisfy the definition of ‘claim,’” and that necessarily “implies that all other written demands seeking payment as a matter of right are ‘claims,’ whether already in dispute or not”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the FAR “specifically excludes only undisputed routine requests for payment from the category of written demands for payment that satisfy the definition of ‘claim,’” and that necessarily “implies that all other written demands seeking payment as a matter of right are ‘claims,’ whether already in dispute or not”
- explaining that “the FAR requires a ‘claim’ to be a written demand seeking a sum certain (or other contract relief) as a matter of right,” which “is consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term ‘claim’: ‘a demand for something due or believed to be due’” (citation omitted)
- holding that submissions qualified as CDA claims when the contractor “asserted in writing and with sufficient specificity a right to additional compensation” and “the contractor communicated his desire for a contracting officer decision”
- noting that “the FAR requires a ‘claim’ to be a written demand seeking a sum certain (or other contract relief) as a matter of right . . . [which] is con- sistent with the ordinary meaning of the term ‘claim’: ‘a de- mand for something due or believed to be due.’” (quoting Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 244 (1990))
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Questioned by Tip Top Construction, Inc. v. Donahoe, 695 F.3d 1276 (2012)
60 F.3d 1572 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc) casts doubt upon the discussion of cost classification in
The opinion
*1584 NIES, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in holding that the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals has jurisdiction in this case. I conclude that there is no requirement for a preexisting dispute as to the amount of a demand for an equitable adjustment where the government has denied any liability. This conclusion is sufficient to dispose of this appeal and I would reverse and remand for this reason.