Opinion

Plas M. Allen v. Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services

  • 48 F.3d 456
  • 95 Daily Journal DAR 2461
  • 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1359
  • 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3535
  • 1995 WL 73738
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Feb 24, 1995
Status
Published
Author
Leavy
On the bench
Thompson, Leavy, Tashima
Cited by
39 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.9%

Abrogated on other grounds by Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002)

"court may consider contingency, but only as one of many competing factors in arriving at a reasonable fee"

How later courts described this case

  • "court may consider contingency, but only as one of many competing factors in arriving at a reasonable fee"
  • incorrect application of law is an abuse of discretion
  • review is for abuse of discretion

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Abrogated on other grounds by Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002)

    48 F.3d 456, 457 (9th Cir.1995), abrogated on other grounds by Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 799, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002).
    Supreme Court of the United StatesMay 28, 20027 citing opinionsother groundsRead it

The opinion

*461 LEAVY, Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

Judge Hogan followed the method of calculating attorney’s fees by starting with the lodestar as required by Starr v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.1987), and Straw v. Bowen, 866 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.1989). He then considered the factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir.1975), which include contingency fee contracts as a consideration. In light of Judge Hogan’s analysis, I cannot concur in the majority’s decision to remand for a recalculation.

The majority remands, not because the district court incorrectly departed from our precedent by considering the contingency fee contract presumptively reasonable, but on the basis that the district court failed to consider the agreement at all. Specifically, the majority finds that the “district court apparently based its decision on a belief that it is impermissible to afford any consideration at all to contingency.” Op. at 460. The majority bases its conclusion on the fact that the district court cited to fee-shifting eases, although § 406(b)(1) is not a fee-shifting statute. Id. at 460. The district court’s analysis, however, clearly distinguished between fee-shifting and § 406(b)(1) eases. Having made the distinction, the district court then discussed the plaintiffs argument that his particular talents and exclusive practice warranted an enhancement. The record does not permit the conclusion that the district court rejected any consideration of the inherent contingency of this type of litigation, nor of the contingent fee contract at issue. Thus, the record does not permit the inference that the district court abused its discretion in finding $4,117.50 to be a reasonable fee. To the contrary, the record shows that the district court carefully considered the plaintiffs arguments as well as the settled Ninth Circuit precedent.

In my view, the district court is being told to consider what it has already considered. I would affirm.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.