finding that prejudgment interest is element of complete compensation and normal incident of relief under Title VII; therefore, uncertainty introduced by jury’s finding of partial failure of Title VII plaintiff to mitigate her damages did not suffice to defeat presumption in favor of prejudgment interest given that, without it, compensation of plaintiff was incomplete and defendant had incentive to delay
How later courts described this case
- finding that prejudgment interest is element of complete compensation and normal incident of relief under Title VII; therefore, uncertainty introduced by jury’s finding of partial failure of Title VII plaintiff to mitigate her damages did not suffice to defeat presumption in favor of prejudgment interest given that, without it, compensation of plaintiff was incomplete and defendant had incentive to delay
- recognizing, in a case where the court sua sponte reduced the attorneys’ fee request, that the district court has discretion to reduce the amount of the fee request, and stating “[w]hen ... defense counsel fails to do so, the district court should not reward the defendants by denying the plaintiff’s counsel an opportunity to defend his claim against specific challenges, whatever their source.”
- holding that “uncertainty” in calculating prejudgment interest does not “defeat the presumption in favor of prejudgment interest” and “[i]t is not within the district court’s discretion to deny the whole award of interest because of ... caleulational ambiguities”
- holding that a denial of front pay was reasonable when the jury “may reasonably have set a date between termination and judgment by which [the employee], using reasonable diligence, should have found ‘comparable’ employment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MANION, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the court in its disposition of the several issues discussed, but wish to emphasize a few points.
In Williamson v. Handy Button Mach. Co., 817 F.2d 1290, 1297-99 (7th Cir.1987), this court reversed the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest. In doing so, we noted that prejudgment interest may be denied because it is not readily determinable. However, in Williamson we reasoned that interest could be properly determined under at least two methods and, therefore, the district court erred in denying prejudgment interest. Similarly, as the court in this case sets forth, the time period represented by the $80,000 verdict is determinable under two methods and, therefore, prejudgment interest is appropriate. Although we reach the correct result here, I emphasize that in some cases the facts underlying the damage award may make the determination of interest too complex and it is then within the trial court’s discretion to deny prejudgment interest. Williamson, 817 F.2d at 1298 (“[i]f some fact or consideration the parties have not drawn to our attention makes the ascertainment of the portion of the award representing back pay too complex, the district court may choose to award none”).
The court remanded the attorney’s fees award merely to allow the district court to set forth its basis for reducing the award. Nevertheless, a reduction in the case was clearly appropriate. This case was straightforward and not complex, yet the plaintiff sought more than $120,000 in attorney fees when the jury awarded Hutchinson $80,000. Moreover, Hutchinson originally brought this case as an age discrimination suit. Hutchinson did not succeed on that claim. Therefore, she was not entitled to any attorney’s fees stemming from the prosecution of the age discrimination claim. Finally, while it might be difficult to sustain a cut-off of what the district court saw as top-heavy staffing charges, some reduction may be appropriate so that the fees charged are reasonable in light of the complexity of the tasks performed.
Finally, this is a closer case on the merits than the court implies. Hutchinson worked at Amateur Electronic for over twenty years. Spreading the complained-of conduct over this extended period of time negates the severity and pervasiveness portrayed by the court. She did not define the environment she worked in for years as hostile until after she was fired. Moreover, Sterman, a 400- to 500-pound man, behaved towards all of his employees in a boorish, rude and obnoxious manner. Much of his behavior was equally demeaning to men and women, thus making sexual harassment charges doubtful. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir.i986) (“instances of complained-of sexual conduct that prove equally offensive to male and female workers would not support a Title VII sexual harassment charge because both men and women were accorded like treatment”); Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza, 878 F.2d 338, 339 (10th Cir.1989) (rough language used indiscriminately by both male and female employees did not constitute hostile workplace environment based on sex harassment). He apparently used this boorish behavior to cover certain personal shortcomings. Whatever the psychology of his loud and sometimes vulgar banter, his behavior was sometimes offensive to male and female employees alike. For example, Ster-man routinely asked both men and women “How’s your sex life?” Greeting all employees — regardless of their gender — in this way, while obnoxious is not sexual harassment. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 ; Ebert, 878 F.2d at 339 . In fact, a male employee of Sterman’s also complained about his vulgarity. 1 Ster- *1050 man’s conduct had to be severe and pervasive enough to alter Hutchinson’s conditions of employment, for her to succeed on a hostile work environment claim. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405 , 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). Nonetheless, given the deference we owe a jury, the facts as presented were sufficient to affirm in this case.
For these reasons, I respectfully concur.
. The court states: "It blinks reality to claim that sexual conduct which demeans women by a man in a position of power, even if not directed at a specific woman victim, equally impacts male and female subordinates.” Opn. at 1043. While true, this statement ignores the nature of the conduct at issue in this case. This is not a case where men are offended by the sexual harass *1050 ment of their female coworkers; rather, here much of the conduct at issue was equally demeaning to men and women. As such, it does not constitute sexual harassment. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 ; Ebert, 878 F.2d at 339 .