holding that a claim for work-related injury within the Act’s definition is preempted but harm from discrimination that was not an injury within the meaning of FECA is not
How later courts described this case
- holding that a claim for work-related injury within the Act’s definition is preempted but harm from discrimination that was not an injury within the meaning of FECA is not
- holding employer vicariously liable where victim submitted to supervisor's requests for oral sex out of fear that she would lose her job if she refused
- noting that a "verbal nexus" between work-related discussions and sexual requests, although not necessary to a finding of an actionable quid pro quo offer, often helps to establish the existence of an implicit condition
- finding that harm suffered from sex discrimination is not an “injury” within the meaning of FECA
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)
42 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 8101 (5)), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742
The opinion
BRUNETTI, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in Parts I, II, III.A.1, and III.B of Judge Reinhardt’s opinion. As to Part III. A.2, I concur only in the result. I further concur in Judge Fernandez’s concurrence.
ORDER
Dec. 13, 1994
The Clerk is directed to add Court of Appeal No. 92-35315 to the existing opinion filed November 29, 1994.