holding that Houston did not apply because 28 C.F.R. § 542.14 expressly defined “filing” as being when a receipt was issued
How later courts described this case
- holding that Houston did not apply because 28 C.F.R. § 542.14 expressly defined “filing” as being when a receipt was issued
- concluding that the mailbox rule did not apply to administrative appeals in federal correctional facilities
- arguing that habeas relief should not be available where there has been no showing that discipline would affect the duration of confinement or likelihood of parole
- declining to apply the prison-mailbox rule because the relevant regulation provided that an appeal is “considered filed when [a] receipt is issued”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOONAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
“Habeas corpus jurisdiction ... exists when a petitioner seeks expungement of a disciplinary finding from his record if ex-pungement is likely to accelerate the prisoner’s eligibility for parole.” Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269-74 (9th Cir.1989), citing McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1047 (7th Cir.1982). In both Bostic and McCollum expungement of the disciplinary finding would accelerate the petitioners’ eligibility for parole, because part of the sanction imposed was forfeiture of Statutory Good Time credit toward parole. Nigro does not allege loss of good time credit, but “possible impact at any parole hearing and/or pre-release program.” This unsubstantiated speculation is insufficient for the court to infer that if the disciplinary proceedings are expunged the length of imprisonment will be reduced. Id. at 1047 . We lack jurisdiction to reach the merits of his appeal.