holding that defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer “could conclude that there were exigent circumstances excusing the requirement that a warrant be obtained” before entering the plaintiff’s home
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity when a reasonable officer “could conclude that there were exigent circumstances excusing the requirement that a warrant be obtained” before entering the plaintiff’s home
- holding that although defendants had violated the plaintiff's clearly established rights, an objectively reasonable officer could have believed that exigent circumstances existed and defendant officers were entitled to qualified immunity
- concluding that no exigency existed when the armed suspect retreated to his home and did not make any verbal threats toward the officers or point his gun at anyone outside the home
- finding unavailability of hot pursuit exception where officer “chose not to pursue [suspect] at the initial confrontation and instead called for backup to surround the house and secure the area, thereby slowing down and controlling the action.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Estate of Bing Ex Rel. Bing v. City of Whitehall, 456 F.3d 555 (2006)
See id. at 997-98. O’Brien is distinguishable from this case in relevant respects.
The opinion
KEITH, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in Part II A of Judge Ryan’s opinion, which found the warrantless use of probes violated O’Brien’s fourth amendment rights, and in Part III of Judge Joiner’s opinion, which found the City of Grand Rapids hable for violating O’Brien’s constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 . Because I disagree with the majority’s analysis of qualified immunity with respect to the officers, I respectfully dissent as to Part II B of Judge Ryan’s opinion and Part II of Judge Joiner’s opinion.
*1006 Reasonable officers realize a warrantless search absent an exceptional situation, such as exigent circumstances, violates the fourth amendment. Reasonable officers would agree in this situation no exigency existed. Describing the unacceptable and outrageous actions taken by officers in this case as “reasonable” offends the competency and professionalism practiced by the overwhelming majority of officers across the nation. Recognizing O’Brien presented “no overt, hostile threat” and there was no probable cause to believe he committed any crime, only unreasonable and overzealous officers would harass and persecute O’Brien by surrounding his home and breaking its windows. In this case, the officers’ refusal to obtain a warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate, despite the passing of several hours, resembles the self-righteous arrogance of a lynch mob. Unfortunately, the officers’ overactive imaginations, irrational paranoia and aggressive conduct incited a scenario which left O’Brien paralyzed. It is precisely this type of situation the fourth amendment is intended to prevent. I would therefore AFFIRM the district court’s finding that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.