holding that a reasonable officer should have known a stop based solely on a person's Hispanic appearance was unconstitutional because "the [stop] occurred long after the Supreme Court ... made clear that the Constitution does not permit such stops"
How later courts described this case
- holding that a reasonable officer should have known a stop based solely on a person's Hispanic appearance was unconstitutional because "the [stop] occurred long after the Supreme Court ... made clear that the Constitution does not permit such stops"
- holding that bor- der officers violated the Fourth Amendment rights of defen- dant by stopping him because of his Hispanic appearance, thereby triggering exclusionary rule in a civil proceeding
- disregarding as 6846 UNITED STATES v. MANZO-JURADO a matter of law an officer’s observations of the defendant— that the defendant failed to look at the officer, appeared ner- vous because he had a dry mouth, and blinked excessively— because such observations “had such a low probative value that no reasonable officer would have relied on them to deter- mine whether there was reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop”
- disregarding as a matter of law an officer’s observations of the defendant— that the defendant failed to look at the officer, appeared ner- vous because he had a dry mouth, and blinked excessively— because such observations “had such a low probative value that no reasonable officer would have relied on them to deter- mine whether there was reasonable suspicion to make an investigative stop”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TANG, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur fully in Judge Nelson’s opinion. I write separately to emphasize that we should not allow our courts to be used to sanction racism in any form. The Supreme Court recognized in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S.Ct. 836 , 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948), that court enforcement of discriminatory covenants was state action subject to the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing the Immigration Service to utilize evidence obtained from racially discriminatory treatment of Hispanics would entail our participation in that discrimination.
The exclusionary rule here serves the essential function of preserving judicial integrity. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1443 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). Where federal agents violate the Fourth Amendment in bad faith by stopping a person solely based on race, judicial integrity would be impaired by allowing the introduction of evidence obtained by racially discriminatory action. “Federal courts cannot countenance deliberate violations of basic constitutional rights. To do so would violate our judicial oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States.” Adamson v. C.I.R., 745 F.2d 541, 546 (9th Cir.1984).