finding that allegations stating that misrepresentations were made “at the direction, under the supervision, or with the knowledge and consent” of all the defendants “would appear to fall short of the standards set forth in the caselaw”
How later courts described this case
- finding that allegations stating that misrepresentations were made “at the direction, under the supervision, or with the knowledge and consent” of all the defendants “would appear to fall short of the standards set forth in the caselaw”
- explaining that “[t]he rule is said to serve three main purposes: (1) protecting a defendant’s reputation from harm; (2) minimizing ‘strike suits’ and ‘fishing expeditions’; and (3) providing notice of the claim to the adverse party”
- concluding that the plaintiff’s alleged losses on cancelable or potentially cancelable leases were not distinct because they stemmed “from the same original contract and similar predicate acts”
- criticizing district court for declining to dismiss amended complaint with prejudice pursuant to Rule 8(a) and noting that “[a] complaint that is prolix and/or confusing makes it difficult for the defendant to file a responsive pleading and makes it difficult for the trial court to conduct orderly litigation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I hesitate to try to add anything to such a searching and exhaustive effort to bring to ground this typically meandering and divaga-tory complaint. RICO is a judge’s nightmare and doggedly persistent efforts to hammer it into a rational shape deserve the utmost respect even though they can rarely accomplish the impossible.
Certainly in pursuing the issue of pattern the majority has addressed the aspect of RICO upon which the Supreme Court has focused most in trying to separate the good RICO from the bad. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 , 109 S.Ct. 2893 , 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989). Pattern is quite fundamental to RICO and, although it too drifts in and out of focus, its prospects for bringing us to useful conclusions are as good as any other. Precedents for pattern or no-pattern are not hard to come by and I think the majority has handled them with *786 aplomb and fairness — not to mention dedication.
My only reservation may be about assigning somewhat arbitrary significance to duration as such. I do not favor any bright-line (e.g., eight months, one year) duration rule. In the case before us there were more than 2000 lease transactions in the 8 months involved. If the “fraudulent acts” had been spread out over 16 months, the case would not seem to be much different. I would not think such a scheme is immune from RICO merely because it lasted eight months instead of twelve or more. Cf. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 254 , 109 S.Ct. at 2908 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Since the Court has rejected the concept of separate criminal ‘schemes’ or ‘episodes’ as a criterion of ‘threatening future criminal conduct,’ I think it must be saying that at least a few months of racketeering activity (and who knows how much more?) is generally for free, as far as RICO is concerned.”). Even with a 16-month duration, however, I agree that there are still grounds to question fulfillment of the pattern requirement in this case.