concluding that the defendant’s trial counsel “could have 19 done a much better job of impeaching [the witness], . . . but the failures regarding 20 impeachment of [the witness] are of comparatively little consequence”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the defendant’s trial counsel “could have 19 done a much better job of impeaching [the witness], . . . but the failures regarding 20 impeachment of [the witness] are of comparatively little consequence”
- holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for demoting deputy sheriff based on his decision to remain neutral during the sheriff's re-election campaign
- “Thompson could reasonably have believed that the position of trust and authority occupied by Plaintiff, as the chief deputy [sheriff], actually made Plaintiff more susceptible than a regular deputy [sheriff] to the demands of political patronage.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Judge Flaum has well and succinctly stated the law regulating patronage dismissals or demotions. Nevertheless, I am compelled to state a different view, even in the face of the precedents cited, in order to call attention to this law enforcement situation.
Plaintiff, as chief deputy, was, as you have seen, demoted because he declined to actively engage in the Sheriffs campaign for reelection. He did not, however, campaign against the Sheriff. He was neutral. He had been a deputy for a long time and had been promoted twice by the Sheriff who then demoted him because of his political neutrality. Plaintiffs other “misdeed” was that he declined to allow the deputies under his supervision to campaign for the Sheriffs reelection during their regular working hours.
The county has an ordinance authorizing sheriffs to appoint full-time deputies according to “merit principles.” What happened in this case has nothing to do with merit, only politics. It was not claimed that the chief deputy was, for instance, incompetent, uncooperative at least in professional matters, antagonistic, disloyal, or insubordinate. Nor is it claimed that this chief deputy, in any degree, interfered with or failed to carry out the Sheriffs law enforcement policies. There is no reason suggested for the demotion other than that the chief deputy wanted to do his law enforcement job undiluted by politics and have those deputies under him do theirs, at least while on county time. The Sheriff, however, wanted them all out campaigning for him. Law enforcement unfortunately appears to be secondary to politics, *428 likely not a unique situation in these important offices.
The Sheriff and his chief deputy certainly must work together with mutual trust. The reason they apparently cannot in this ease is the fault of the Sheriff, not the chief deputy. I view the Sheriffs actions as a disservice to law enforcement. The Sheriff has all the leeway he needs to be able to fire or demote his deputy for legitimate cause. Politics should not be an active ingredient of good law enforcement.
The majority opinion concludes that the holdings in Dimmig v. Wahl, 983 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.1993), Heideman v. Wirsing, 7 F.3d 659 (7th Cir.1993), and Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir.1991), did not for immunity purposes clearly forbid the firing of the chief deputy. In Upton, 930 F.2d at 1210 , the fired deputy actively and personally supported the losing candidate which at least distinguishes it from the present case. In Dimmig the fired deputy was only on probationary status and vulnerable, but this court also makes clear that the fired deputy was neutral and campaigned against no one. Id. at 87 . Except for the probationary status that is the present case. Judge Eschbach dissented noting the deputy was fired because he would not campaign for the sheriff which is a form of compelled speech repugnant to the First Amendment. Id. at 88 . In Heideman the fired deputy was also a probationary deputy and in addition got in a barroom hassle growing out of his opposition to the winning sheriff candidate. That distinguishes it from the present case. In his concurrence in Heideman, 7 F.3d at 664 , Judge Ripple points out that “[mjany communities in this nation have recognized that politics and police work not only need not go hand in hand, but ought not to go hand in hand.” Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 , 106 S.Ct. 313 , 88 L.Ed.2d 289 (1985), is also cited by the majority. That case, however, involved an employee of the city water department, not a law enforcement officer. I therefore have no objection to the result reached in Tomczak . Except for Tomczak , which I do not see as applicable, these cases the majority cites were decided after plaintiff was demoted and forecast continued law enforcement personnel actions governed by politics. These cited cases, however, can all be factually distinguished from our present case.
People everywhere are deeply concerned about the extremely serious national crime situation and are searching for ways to do something about it from the Congress to farmers in our rural areas. This court could help. One thing that surely will not advance our crime fighting efforts is to have deputy sheriffs hired, fired, or demoted on the basis of which one of them can best work voting precincts in behalf of the sheriff boss. Instead the basis must be professional competence and abilities. The citizens are the losers even more than this particular chief deputy. Other law enforcement people will continue to be plagued by law enforcement politics and so will our citizens.
Back in 1832 Alexis de Tocqueville said that politics “is the only pleasure an American knows.” Keeping law enforcement on a professional law enforcement basis, rather than on a political one, would not unduly limit our political pleasure which we have plenty of already.
I join the views of my colleagues Judge Eschbach and Judge Ripple expressed in the other cases and therefore ask our court to reexamine and reconsider even our recent decisions relating to law enforcement patronage practices, but only as relates to politically neutral law enforcement officers like the plaintiff in this case. I do not see our opinions as being compelled by the Supreme Court. There is no reason in these crime-troubled times for law enforcement personnel to be under the same rule as non-law enforcement personnel. If we do not draw the law enforcement politics exception line in sheriffs offices we will have to continue in the future to risk politics where it does not belong.
I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.