explaining the three-pronged test for equitable tolling in California and noting that “[t]he doctrine of equitable tolling focuses on the effect of the prior claim in warning the defendants in the subsequent claim of the need to prepare a defense”
How later courts described this case
- explaining the three-pronged test for equitable tolling in California and noting that “[t]he doctrine of equitable tolling focuses on the effect of the prior claim in warning the defendants in the subsequent claim of the need to prepare a defense”
- holding that it was error to dismiss after a “threshold inquiry” that equitable tolling did not apply as a matter of law because the prior administrative and state court proceedings “were not ‘substantially similar’ to this action”
- explaining that "California courts have liberally applied tolling rules or their functional equivalents to situations in which the plaintiff has satisfied the notification purpose of a limitations statute.” (citation omitted)
- stating California’s three-pronged test for equitable tolling and explaining that dismissal may be appropriate when it is evident from the face of the complaint that equitable tolling is unavailable as a matter of law
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Department of the Interior v. Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, 532 U.S. 1 (2001)
5 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 6 223
Distinguished
Distinguished by Paco v. Myers, 430 P.3d 891 (2018)
Id. The instant case is distinguishable from Cervantes on various grounds, most importantly that Paco did not file this suit in a different forum; rather, Paco filed a new suit in the same forum rather than pursuing relief in the Prior Suit from the trial court, such as through an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion, or by way of appellate review of the judgment in the Prio
The opinion
FARRIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur. My brothers and I differ in the rationale.
In Arnold v. United States, 816 F.2d 1306, 1812 (9th Cir.1987), we recited the three-pronged test for equitable tolling, but did not inquire as to the satisfaction of any or all of the prongs because the doctrine of “equitable tolling does not apply when a plaintiff has pursued a remedy as to only one of several distinct wrongs.” Thus, contrary to Judge *1278 Reinhardt’s analysis, the question of whether two claims seek to remedy distinct wrongs is a threshold question. If the wrongs are distinct, the three-pronged test is not even implicated. If the wrongs are not distinct, and the plaintiff merely pursues one of several potential legal remedies, tolling applies. We can then reach the issue of whether California’s three-part test is satisfied.
In Donoghue v. Orange County, 848 F.2d 926, 931 (9th Cir.1987), we vacated and remanded for a determination of whether the statute of limitations for the plaintiffs § 1983 claim was tolled by her prior state court action. Our remand was to permit the district court to evaluate Donoghue’s several state and federal claims to ascertain whether the wrongs were distinct.
I would hold that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint at this stage of the proceedings because nothing on the face of the complaint is inconsistent with a showing by the plaintiff that the statute should be tolled, i.e., a showing that the wrongs were not distinct and that the three-part test was satisfied. I would remand to permit such a showing.
Perhaps the district court will not be confused by the majority rationale. I offer a substitute to clarify, not to confuse. We all conclude, as we must, that California law controls. I agree that we must reverse and remand.