holding that county’s search procedures did not 17 violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because there was a reasonable balance 18 between inmate privacy and the needs of the institution, and rejecting petitioner’s proposal 19 – that new detainees not arrested for serious crimes or for offenses involving weapons or 20 drugs be exempt from invasive searches unless they give officers a particular reason to 21 suspect them of hiding contraband – as unworkable
How later courts described this case
- holding that county’s search procedures did not 17 violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments because there was a reasonable balance 18 between inmate privacy and the needs of the institution, and rejecting petitioner’s proposal 19 – that new detainees not arrested for serious crimes or for offenses involving weapons or 20 drugs be exempt from invasive searches unless they give officers a particular reason to 21 suspect them of hiding contraband – as unworkable
- holding that strip 17 searches involving the removal of pretrial detainee’s clothing and visual inspection of his 18 ears, nose, mouth, hair, scalp, skin, “other body openings,” genitalia, and rectal cavity, 19 “regardless of the circumstances of the arrest, the suspected offense, or the detainee’s 20 behavior, demeanor, or criminal history,” are reasonable searches under the Fourth 21 Amendment
- stating that the term “strip search” is imprecise and can include an “instruction to remove clothing while an officer observes from a distance of, say, five feet or more” or “directing” individu als to run their fingers through their own hair, to raise their arms, or expose their own body parts with no touching by the official
- explaining the limits of Florence’s ruling and commenting that “[t]his case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches that would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be held without 56 assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other detainees”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 39 F. Supp. 3d 635 (2014)
I find that Florence specifically addresses only adult detainees, is distinguishable from the instant matter and will not bar Plaintiffs’ unreasonable search claim.
Distinguished by Vollette v. Watson, 978 F. Supp. 2d 572 (2013)
The comparison to Florence, however, is inapposite as Florence analyzes the legal standard governing strip searches of jail detainees that have been arrested on suspicion of criminal activity, not the standard governing strip searches of correctional employees and contractors.
Distinguished by Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 908 F. Supp. 2d 976 (2012)
The plaintiffs argue that Florence is inapplicable, because none of the plaintiffs were admitted to “general population” in the jail, so that circuit precedent requiring reasonable suspicion to strip search detainees still prevails in their circumstances.
The opinion
Chief Justice Roberts,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court. As with Justice Alito, however, it is important for me that the Court does not foreclose the possibility of an exception to the rule it announces. Justice Kennedy explains that the circumstances before it do not afford an opportunity to consider that possibility. Ante, at 339. Those circumstances include the facts that Florence was detained not for a minor traffic offense but instead pursuant to a warrant for his arrest, and that there was apparently no alternative, if Florence were to be detained, to holding him in the general jail population.
Factual nuances have not played a significant role as this case has been presented to the Court. Both courts below regarded acknowledged factual disputes as “immaterial” to their conflicting dispositions, 621 F. 3d 296, 300 (CA3 2010), and before this Court Florence challenged suspicionless strip searches “no matter what the circumstances,” Pet. for Cert. i.
The Court makes a persuasive case for the general applicability of the rule it announces. The Court is nonetheless wise to leave open the possibility of exceptions, to ensure that we “not embarrass the future.” Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U. S. 292, 300 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.).