holding that defendant can claim ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a rejected plea and that to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances, and also that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant can claim ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of a rejected plea and that to establish the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances, and also that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed
- holding that where a defendant rejected a plea offer based on counsel’s incompetent advice, "a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed”
- holding to establish prejudice when a defendant has rejected a plea offer on the basis of deficient advice, the defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice, there is a reasonable probability the court would have been presented with the plea, that is, "that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it," "the court would have accepted its terms," and "the conviction or sentence, or both," under the plea "would have been less severe" than the judgment and sentence imposed
- stating "a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 2013 Pa. Super. 163 (2013)
However, we disagree with Appellant that Frye and Lafler created a new constitutional right.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 2013 Pa. Super. 243 (2013)
We first address the applicability of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lafler, and we observe that the facts in Lafler are distinguishable from the instant case.
Distinguished by United States ex rel. Cichon v. Lemke, 922 F. Supp. 2d 716 (2013)
Respondent has not argued that the Lafler rule is inapplicable under Teague — indeed, our Court of Appeals has already held in Hare v. United States, 688 F.3d 878, 879 (7th Cir.2012) that neither Lafler nor its companion case, Missouri v. Frye, -U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), set out a "new rule” under the Teague formulation.
The opinion
Justice Alito,
dissenting.
For the reasons set out in Parts I and II of Justice Scalia’s dissent, the Court’s holding in this case misapplies our ineffective-assistance-of-counsel case law and violates the requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. Respondent received a trial that was free of any identified constitutional error, and, as a result, there is no basis for concluding that respondent suffered prejudice and certainly not for granting habeas relief.
The weakness in the Court’s analysis is highlighted by its opaque discussion of the remedy that is appropriate when a plea offer is rejected due to defective legal representation. If a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights are violated when deficient legal advice about a favorable plea offer causes the opportunity for that bargain to be lost, the only logical remedy is to- give the defendant the benefit of the favorable deal. But such a remedy would cause serious injustice in many instances, as I believe the Court tacitly recognizes. The Court therefore eschews the only logical remedy and relies on the lower courts to exercise sound discretion in determining what is to be done..
Time will tell how this works out. The Court, for its part, finds it unnecessary to define “the boundaries of proper discretion” in today’s opinion. Ante, at 171. In my view, re *188 quiring the prosecution to renew an old plea offer would represent an abuse of discretion in at least two circumstances: first, when important new information about a defendant’s culpability comes to light after the offer is rejected, and, second, when the rejection of the plea offer results in a substantial expenditure of scarce prosecutorial or judicial resources.
The lower court judges who must implement today’s holding may — and I hope, will — do so in a way that mitigates its potential to produce unjust results. But I would not depend on these judges to come to the rescue. The Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is unsound, and I therefore respectfully dissent.