holding that a supervisory official may be held liable only if “(1) he affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements unconstitutional policies that causally result in the constitutional injury.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a supervisory official may be held liable only if “(1) he affirmatively participates in the acts that cause the constitutional deprivation, or (2) he implements unconstitutional policies that causally result in the constitutional injury.”
- providing “In order to establish supervisor liability for constitutional violations committed by subordinate employees, plaintiff must show that the supervisor act[ed], or fail[ed] to act, with deliberate indifference to violations of others’ constitutional rights committed by their subordinates.”
- holding that a supervisory official may be held liable under section 1983 for implementing an unconstitutional policy that causally results in a constitutional injury
- recognizing that qualified immunity shields officials unless the plaintiff demonstrates the defendant violated a constitutional right that was “clearly established”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
OWEN, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the opinion of the court, except to the extent that it might be read as placing any reliance on this court’s decision in Bryan v. Jones. 2
In this court’s en banc opinion in Bryan, we said more than thirty-five years ago that a jailer could be held liable “[i]f he negligently establishes a record keeping system in which errors [leading to continued incarceration after charges were dismissed] are likely.” 3 In light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions, 4 this is not a correct statement of the law.
As today’s opinion correctly notes, liability for failures to promulgate policy, train, or supervise can only arise when the defendant acts with deliberate indifference, 5 a considerably higher standard than negligence. 6 “[Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action,” 7 not merely a likely one. The court’s opinion today properly applies current Supreme Court precedent as the governing law. To the extent that Bryan is cited as establishing a negligent standard, that is not the applicable standard, and it is not the standard that the court actually applies.
With the foregoing explanation, I concur in the opinion of the court.
. 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.1976) (en banc).
. Id. at 1215 .
. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1350 , 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011); Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 , 117 S.Ct. 1382 , 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997).
. Ante, at 446-47.
. Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 407 , 117 S.Ct. 1382 ("A showing of simple or even heightened negligence will not suffice.”).
. Connick, 131 S.Ct. at 1360 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 409 , 117 S.Ct. 1382 ) (internal quotation marks omitted).