Opinion

Carol L. Kirchner GAFFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee

  • 997 F.2d 150
  • 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,451
  • 62 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 205
  • 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 14766
  • 1993 WL 210535
Court
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Filed
Jun 18, 1993
Status
Published
Author
Ryan
On the bench
Jones, Ryan, Peck
Cited by
491 cases

Abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010)

explaining that a survey of case law revealed at least three different burdens of proof; "(1) the defendant must prove, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff’s claims are not less than the federal amount-in-controversy requirement; (2) the defendant must prove, 'more likely than not,' that the plaintiff’s claims meet the federal amount-in-controversy requirement; and (3) the defendant must show that there is 'a probability’ or ‘some reasonable probability' that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal amount-in-controversy requirement, or that the amount in controversy ‘may’ or ‘could’ exceed the requirement (i.e., it does not appear to a legal certainty that the plaintiff's claims are for less than that amount).”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that a survey of case law revealed at least three different burdens of proof; "(1) the defendant must prove, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff’s claims are not less than the federal amount-in-controversy requirement; (2) the defendant must prove, 'more likely than not,' that the plaintiff’s claims meet the federal amount-in-controversy requirement; and (3) the defendant must show that there is 'a probability’ or ‘some reasonable probability' that the amount in controversy exceeds the federal amount-in-controversy requirement, or that the amount in controversy ‘may’ or ‘could’ exceed the requirement (i.e., it does not appear to a legal certainty that the plaintiff's claims are for less than that amount).”
  • recognizing that a party’s affirmative and explicit concession that the amount in controversy requirement is met may be sufficient in some cases to establish that requirement
  • noting, in dicta, the conflict among the circuits in various removal cases and the use of the “reasonable probability” or “substantial likelihood” standard in some district courts when the plaintiff has specifically claimed less than the federal amount-in-controversy requirement, and ultimately affirming that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a diversity action using the “preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof where the plaintiff sought to recover some unspecified amount of damages
  • holding that “a petition for removal may be amended under the same considerations governing the amendment of any other pleading containing jurisdictional allegations”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Abrogated on other grounds by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010)

    997 F.2d 150, 159 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated by Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77
    Supreme Court of the United StatesFeb 23, 201052 citing opinionsother groundsRead it
  • Abrogated on other grounds by Shropshire v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 550 F.3d 570 (2008)

    Co., 997 F.2d 150, 165 (6th Cir.1993), abrogated on other grounds by Shropshire v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 550 F.3d 570, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 822, 130 S.Ct. 110, 175 L.Ed.2d 32 (2009); accord Beal ex rel.
    Court of Appeals for the Sixth CircuitDec 18, 2008other groundsmedium confidenceRead it

The opinion

RYAN, Circuit Judge,

concurring.

I concur in the result reached in my brother’s opinion, and in most of the underlying analysis. I do not think, however, that it is necessary to address the burden of proof issue with respect to the district court’s jurisdiction, as my brother has done in parts III— A and B of his opinion.

There is no question on this record that plaintiffs counsel conceded at the jurisdiction hearing in the district court that the amount in controversy was over $50,000:

[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: Judge, I wish, I wish I could accomodate [sic] you so that you could remand it. However, I can’t now that we have the figures. I believe that that evidence, being of record before the court, completes the amount in controversy.

THE COURT: And what is the amount in controversy?

[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: Judge, I haven’t calculated it at this point in time, but I think what the number is, the differences between the twenty-seven that Mrs. Gaf-ford made as a maximum, and the fifty-six, if, if in fact we’re looking at almost thirty difference in that point in time. And I can see where a jury might find at least two years, it looks like the amount in controversy, since GE has provided us with that figure.

Moreover, at oral argument before this court, in response to a question asked by the presiding judge, plaintiffs counsel conceded that the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000.

I would hold for another day, in a case in which the requisite jurisdictional amount in a diversity of citizenship case remanded to a federal court is not conceded, a discussion and decision concerning the burden of proof on that issue.

That said, I concur in the judgment for affirmance.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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