holding that the Government’s use of psychiatric evidence on the issue of future dangerousness during the penalty phase violated the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, in light of the failure to provide the defendant with Miranda warnings before the examination and the failure to inform defense counsel that the examination would encompass the issue of future dangerousness
How later courts described this case
- holding that the Government’s use of psychiatric evidence on the issue of future dangerousness during the penalty phase violated the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, in light of the failure to provide the defendant with Miranda warnings before the examination and the failure to inform defense counsel that the examination would encompass the issue of future dangerousness
- holding that “the federal standard — a lesser included offense must be given when a jury could rationally convict of the lesser offense and acquit on the greater offense— is equivalent to the Beck standard”
- explaining that “a knowing and voluntary waiver of Miranda rights does not require that the defendant understand every possible consequence of the decision to waive the right”
- examining psychiatrist is obliged to inform the defendant "that the psychiatric examination c[an] be used against him at the sentencing phase on the issue of future dangerousness[.]"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially:
“The Fifth Amendment privilege [against compelled self-incrimination] ... is fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right ‘to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence.’ ” Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467-68, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1875 , 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981) (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 , 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493-94 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964)). Vanderbilt insisted, against the advice of counsel, upon submitting to a psychiatric evaluation, even though he was informed that the results of the evaluation would be made available to the prosecutor. Vanderbilt was the victim of neither coercion nor deception, but instead “ch[ose] to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.”
I agree with the majority that, under our decision in Battie v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 692 (1981), “the fact that the defense requested the examination does not obviate the necessity for giving the Miranda warnings where the defense did not request such an examination on the question of future dangerousness.” See id. at 702 . However, I write separately to express my view that Battie , insofar as it affords relief to a criminal defendant who has spoken in the unfettered exercise of his own will, against the advice of counsel, is adrift from the fundamental interests protected by the Fifth Amendment, Miranda, and Estelle. I concur specially in Part II of the majority’s opinion.