explaining that liability must be “based on a finding that the policymakers have actual or constructive notice [of] a particular omission that is likely to result in constitutional violations,” which avoids the risk of “creating de facto respondeat superior liability” (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 693–94)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that liability must be “based on a finding that the policymakers have actual or constructive notice [of] a particular omission that is likely to result in constitutional violations,” which avoids the risk of “creating de facto respondeat superior liability” (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 693–94)
- stating that a practice of committing disciplin- ary matters to the discretion of a subordinate in a school system argu- ably "could result in the actions of the subordinate, however conducted, being municipal policy as long as the official is acting 14 within the scope of his or her employment"
- stating that a practice of committing disciplinary matters to the discretion of a subordinate in a school system arguably “could result in the actions of the subordinate, however conducted, being municipal policy as long as the official is acting within the scope of his or her employment”
- finding that Doe did not clearly establish the unconstitutionally of strip searches of students, and “[b]ecause Corn field has not succeeded in placing the actions taken by Spencer and Frye outside a ‘clearly established’ constitutional norm, they are entitled to qualified immunity”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Parts I.A and I.B of the court’s opinion show convincingly that defendants Spencer and Frye did not violate Cornfield’s rights. I join these portions of the opinion. The discussions of qualified immunity and municipal liability in Parts I.C and II are unnecessary, and I do not join them. Because Spencer and Frye did no wrong this case is over, and the opinion should end with that conclusion.
Spencer and Frye presented a defense of qualified immunity because they wanted to avoid paying damages were we to agree with Cornfield on the merits. Cornfield argued that Spencer and Frye were following or had set a municipal “policy” because he wanted a deep pocket from which to collect damages were we to hold the search unconstitutional. Both of these subjects lose their significance once we conclude, as we have, that the individual defendants respected Cornfield’s constitutional rights. Having made the litigants’ contentions irrelevant, we should withhold comment. Our views about these subjects are advisory — pertinent to some other case, perhaps, but inconsequential to this one. That the parties have mooted a subject that turns out to be irrelevant is neither reason nor authority for judicial exegesis on the matter.