holding that defendant’s prior armed robbery convictions were separate because they were “against different No. 15-6395 United States v. Southers Page 9 victims at different places and at distinctly different times,” where they were at distinct businesses and separated by approximately forty-five minutes
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant’s prior armed robbery convictions were separate because they were “against different No. 15-6395 United States v. Southers Page 9 victims at different places and at distinctly different times,” where they were at distinct businesses and separated by approximately forty-five minutes
- holding that defendant’s prior armed robbery convictions were separate because they were “against different victims at different places and at distinctly different times,” where they were at distinct businesses and separated by approximately forty-five minutes
- concluding that a defendant’s prior robbery convictions were separate offenses because, “although committed within less than an hour of each other,” the crimes were committed at “different times and places and against different victims”
- holding that two armed robberies of two different, neighboring businesses, committed by the defendant within thirty minutes of one another, were committed on “occasions different from one another” for purposes of the ACCA
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I concur in the dissent of Judge Jones. I cannot join in an opinion which states, “we believe that offenses committed by a defendant at different times and places and against different victims, although committed within less than an hour of each other, are separate and distinct criminal episodes and that convictions for those crimes should be counted as separate predicate convictions under § 924(e)(1).” United States v. Brady, 914 F.2d 258 (6th Cir.1993) (en bane). If this is what Congress intended, this is what Congress should have said. Because Congress did not say clearly that was the statutory intent, I cannot join in the conclusion that there is no ambiguity in section 924(e)(1).