stating that“before a 26 district court may dismiss a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim, the court must provide 27 the pro se litigant with notice of the deficiencies of his or her complaint and an opportunity to 28 amend the complaint prior to dismissal.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that“before a 26 district court may dismiss a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim, the court must provide 27 the pro se litigant with notice of the deficiencies of his or her complaint and an opportunity to 28 amend the complaint prior to dismissal.”
- explaining that a defendant may be deliberately indifferent if he purposefully ignores or fails to respond to an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment
- holding that where a "plaintiff cannot cure the defect that led to dismissal or elects to stand on [a] dismissed complaint ... the order of dismissal is final and appealable." (citation omitted)
- explaining that where a prisoner is alleging that delay or interference with medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the prisoner must show that the delay led to further injury
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (1997)
974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled in part on other grounds 21 by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136
Overruled on other grounds by United States v. Turner, 104 F.3d 1180 (1997)
974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1183
Overruled on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)
974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir.1992) overruled on other grounds by WMX Tech., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.1997). According to Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), “deliberate indifference” to a serious medical need exists “if [the prison official] knows that [the] inmate[ ] face[s] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take…
Overruled on other grounds by Lemire v. California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062 (2013)
974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Tech., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 , 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)). 29 Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074
The opinion
FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the result reached in the majority opinion. However, my agreement is only to the propositions specifically set forth in this concurrence, and not to the more expansive and additional propositions contained in that opinion.
First, I do agree that we have jurisdiction over this case because, as the majority points out, it is absolutely clear that the district court intended to and did dispose of the entire case when it entered its judgment of September 25, 1990. That is so, despite the fact that the judgment itself is ambiguous in form.
Second, as to Catsaros and Butlin, I agree that the district court should not have dismissed the action without first issuing an order explaining the problems in the complaint and giving McGuckin an opportunity to amend to correct those deficiencies. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir.1987). I am not, however, willing to declare that McGuckin will or will not be able to correct the deficiencies as to Catsaros. I would leave that to McGuckin and to the district court’s determination. I am also not willing to declare that amendments to name Butlin will be effective to make him a party to this action. I would leave to the district court the determination of whether the use of what was probably an incorrect name will avoid any statute of limitations problems. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). I would also leave the determination of the sufficiency of the pleading and the question of whether good cause was shown for the failure to serve within 120 days to the district court. Fed. R.Civ.P. 4(j).
Third, with respect to doctors Smith and Medlin, I agree that summary judgment was proper. Under no proper reading of the concept of deliberate indifference could they be found to have violated that constitutional standard. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98-105 , 105 n. 10, 97 S.Ct. 285, 288-291 , 291 n. 10, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (deliberate indifference standard set forth and examples of deliberate indifference given); cf. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 , 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205 , 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (at times the need for training is so obvious and the lack so likely to lead to constitutional violations that there is deliberate indifference).
Finally, I do not join in any suggestion that under the facts of this case any person, or the prison system itself, is guilty of deliberate indifference or other misconduct. It may be that they are, but I would not allude to any of those matters. Nor would-I set out detailed statements regarding the “facts” lest they be taken to be established on remand. I would leave all of these matters to the determination of the district court after it has had an opportunity to review all of the evidence. I would also make it clear that to the extent that facts are referred to, those references are not intended to be factual decisions which cannot be further explored or controverted on remand.
Thus, I concur in the result.