explaining that “[i]ssues of law — constitutional imperatives, statutory construction, procedural requirements — come to [the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit] for decision with little if any deference owed to or expected by the forums below”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[i]ssues of law — constitutional imperatives, statutory construction, procedural requirements — come to [the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit] for decision with little if any deference owed to or expected by the forums below”
- stating that the Court does not “reweigh the factual evidence, . . . assess whether the special master correctly evaluated the evidence [,] . . . [or] examine the probative value of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses”
- explaining that the evidence—that White experienced a URI with a ten-day history of symptoms, his sputum findings positive for H. influenzae and that his chest X-ray findings showed wors- ening lung conditions—were persuasive
- holding that the court would review legal issues de novo after concluding that the “Claims Court’s judgment is entitled to at least the same deference by us as that accorded the special master by the Claims Court.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WILSON COWEN, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the result reached by the court and concur generally in its opinion, subject to the following:
With respect to our review in vaccine cases after the 1989 amendments to the applicable statute, the opinion states that the standard of review therein set forth is “consistent with and elaborates upon the standard for review of post-1989 vaccine compensation cases first enunciated in Hines v. Secretary of the Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518 (Fed.Cir.1991).”
In Hines , the court stated:
in a case arising under the 1989 amendments to the Vaccine Act, we review de novo the Claims Court’s determination as to whether or not the special master’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. In effect, then, we review the underlying decision of the special master under the arbitrary and capricious standard of § 300aa-12(e)(2)(B). [Citation omitted].
940 F.2d at 1524 .
I join in the court's opinion with the understanding that full effect has been given to our decision in Hines and that the opinion does not limit or conflict in any way with the above-quoted statement in that case.