“Despite its lofty ideals, the rule of lenity is not an automatic addendum that accompanies every criminal statute that Congress may choose to enact; rather, it is simply a canon of statutory construction. The rule plays no role in statutory interpretation unless the statute is truly ambiguous.”
How later courts described this case
- “Despite its lofty ideals, the rule of lenity is not an automatic addendum that accompanies every criminal statute that Congress may choose to enact; rather, it is simply a canon of statutory construction. The rule plays no role in statutory interpretation unless the statute is truly ambiguous.”
- “If the statute’s language is unambiguous, its plain language controls except in 24 rare and exceptional circumstances.”
- “[T]he court [should] not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”
- applying rule of lenity to determine whether defendant’s conduct amounted to a misdemeanor or felony
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TANG, Circuit Judge
dissenting:
This case demonstrates that if you look at a statute long enough and hard enough, even the clearest language can appear to become ambiguous. Because I disagree with my learned colleagues that 18 U.S.C. § 510 (c) is ambiguous, I respectfully dissent.
In construing a statute, this court looks first to the plain meaning of the language in question. United States v. 594,464 Pounds of Salmon, 871 F.2d 824, 825 (9th Cir.1989). If a statute’s language is “unambiguous, its plain language controls unless the Congress has ‘clearly expressed’ a contrary legislative intention.” Id. at 826 (quotation omitted). Section § 510(c) of Title 18 states:
If the face value of the Treasury check or bond or security of the United States or the aggregate face value, if more than one Treasury check or bond or security of the United States, does not exceed $500, in any of the above-mentioned offenses, the penalty shall be a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
(emphasis added).
I find the underlined language unambiguous. It simply states that when the aggregate face value of checks passed in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 510 (a) or § 510(b) is less than $500, the maximum penalty is $1,000 or one year in jail. The statute does not limit the aggregation of the checks to each of the defendant’s offenses. Rather, the statute refers to the “above mentioned” offenses, meaning those defined in *406 § 510(a) and § 510(b). As stated by the majority, the legislative history is sparse. However, in that sparse history, there is no clearly expressed Congressional intent which is contrary to the plain meaning of this statute. Because the meaning of this statute is clear, the rule of lenity has no application in this case.
The majority states “the plain language of subsection (c) does not clearly specify what may, or may not, be aggregated for the purpose of determining eligibility for its misdemeanor provision.” I submit that the statute does. It states that all checks that fall within the ambit of § 510(a) and § 510(b) are to be aggregated. No further clarification is necessary. The only other court to examine this statute has come to the same conclusion. United States v. Taylor, 869 F.2d 812, 815-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, —, 110 S.Ct. 171 , 107 L.Ed.2d 128 (1989).
LeCoe also argues that the statute violates her due process rights relying on United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 , 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2203 , 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979). LeCoe argues that the statute does not state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating § 510. As outlined above, I believe that the statute is clear in that all checks were meant to be aggregated as long as they fell within the definition of § 510. If the aggregation of those checks amounted to over $500, then § 510(c) does not apply and each of the offenses is a felony subject to ten years in jail, a $10,000 fine, or both. Therefore, LeCoe’s due process challenge must fail. Taylor, 869 F.2d at 816 .
LeCoe’s final argument is that this statute violates the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment because Congress did not authorize the aggregation of the checks from separate counts. As noted above, that is exactly what Congress clearly and unambiguously did. Therefore, I would reject LeCoe’s double jeopardy claim. Id.
I believe 18 U.S.C. § 510 (c) is not ambiguous. It does not violate either the due process clause or the double jeopardy clause. Therefore, I would affirm the felony convictions. Because I believe that the majority position in the fifth circuit’s Taylor case is persuasive, I respectfully dissent.