holding that security guard had no clearly established First Amendment right to tell officer he could not proceed onto premises in pursuit of suspect, but, even if plaintiff had such right, reasonable officer would have believed that arrest for obstructing official business was constitutional
How later courts described this case
- holding that security guard had no clearly established First Amendment right to tell officer he could not proceed onto premises in pursuit of suspect, but, even if plaintiff had such right, reasonable officer would have believed that arrest for obstructing official business was constitutional
- holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate a clearly established right, and even if they did actually violate the law a reasonable police officer in like circumstances could have believed the conduct to be lawful
- holding that a relevant inquiry in determining if qualified immunity is available is whether a reasonable officer would have believed that the arrest was lawful
- recognizing that qualified immunity may quarantine a state official from a lawsuit asserted under §§ 1981, 1983, and/or other federal civil rights provisions
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the court that plaintiff’s First Amendment argument is not well taken, nor is the district court’s analysis of that argument correct. But the case does not end there.
The court’s analysis would lead one to believe that all that was involved here was Johnson’s refusal to let Officer Overstreet enter private property. Much more occurred. I refer to the district court’s summary of this incident.
Johnson told Officer Overstreet that he could not admit him. Johnson asserts in his complaint that he was not permitted to admit Officer Overstreet to the premises since this was not an emergency. The gate to this entrance was open the entire time Officer Overstreet was present. Officer Laccheo arrived in a *113 second police car after being called by Overstreet. Johnson then allowed Over-street entry to CEI. Officer Overstreet issued the traffic citation to the CEI employee. Officer Laccheo requested identification of Johnson. Johnson alleges that after speaking with his supervisor, he provided Officer Laccheo with his Ohio State Security Guard registration card but that Laccheo stated this identification “was not good enough” and requested Johnson’s driver’s license which Johnson alleges he then provided. Officer Laccheo placed Johnson under arrest for obstructing justice. Officer Laccheo contends that he used physical force to effect the arrest because Johnson attempted to break custody. Johnson contends force was used ás a result of his attempt to advise his supervisor that he was being arrested and that Gate #2 would be unguarded.
The arrest occurred after Overstreet finished ticketing the traffic offender and was made by Officer Laccheo for an alleged misdemeanor not committed in his presence. He used force to make the arrest, and plaintiff contends none was called for.
Johnson was less than fully cooperative with the police on two occasions — first, when he initially refused entry to Officer Overstreet and, second, when he called his supervisor before showing his identification to Officer Laccheo. If the officers arrested Overstreet for obstruction of justice on this basis, I would be inclined to extend qualified immunity to them. But, if they made an arrest using more force than necessary simply to flex the muscle of their authority, then they are not entitled to immunity. 1 The district judge concluded that he could not resolve at this juncture which of the parties’ versions was the correct one because the facts necessary to resolve this issue were themselves in dispute. I agree.
Although qualified immunity is, as the court states, “a legal question to be determined by the trial judge,” this does not mean that such question cannot be clouded by factual disputes. Defendants brought a summary judgment motion. In order for a summary judgment motion to be granted, the trial judge must be satisfied that there are no genuinely disputed material facts. Whether there are facts in dispute is itself a factual determination and should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. When such a standard is applied, I believe the district judge must be affirmed.
I also believe the court’s opinion fails to differentiate between a true qualified immunity motion, which when denied may be the subjection of an interlocutory appeal, 2 and a regular summary judgment motion, which cannot be appealed when denied. I would suggest the following as an illustration. If police officer Doe is sued in a section 1983 action on a false arrest theory and brings a summary judgment motion based on the fact the defendant allegedly has sued the wrong officer, this does not present a pure legal question. In my opinion, the police officer has no interlocutory appeal if the judge denies his summary judgment motion on the basis of it being unclear whether officer Doe actually was involved. I believe this to be true no matter how blatantly erroneous the trial judge’s ruling appears to be. In the true qualified immunity situation, these problems are not present. The police officer says, in effect, “Let’s assume I did everything the defendant says I did. I’m still off the hook because an objectively reasonable police officer would not have known he was violating a clearly established legal right.” Since juries would be ill equipped to determine what is a “clearly established legal right,” we have delegated this decision to the judge. But, I repeat, if what the officer actually did, as opposed to the legal effect of what he did, is the basis of *114 the dispute, 3 then we evaluate a district court’s ruling as well as the right to interlocutory appeal by the same standards we use in reviewing any other type of summary judgment.
I would affirm. 4
. Police officers have some tough decisions to make that often have to be made quickly and under adverse circumstances. They are entitled to societal as well as judicial protection from personally being held liable for every wrong decision they make under such circumstances. However, petty tyranny deserves no such protection.
. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).
. The officer’s state of mind does not enter the qualified immunity calculus. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982).
. My vote to affirm does not mean this case may not be the subject of another summary judgment motion, which might be granted. All I would affirm is the trial judge’s decision that the case is not ripe for disposition at this time.