holding that “[t]he march of time began” for the period in which to file a Rule 59(e) motion on the date the court entered an order that was “immediately appealable”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[t]he march of time began” for the period in which to file a Rule 59(e) motion on the date the court entered an order that was “immediately appealable”
- noting that although brevity is permissible on summary judgment motions, "a bench decision or memorandum' which explicates the trial court’s thinking will often prove to be of inestimable value to the litigants and to a reviewing court”
- deciding that because district court’s rejection of qualified immunity and denial of summary judgment was “functional equivalent of a judgment for purposes of appeal,” court’s order “came within the purview of” Rule 59(e)
- noting that restrictions on pendent jurisdiction are “self-imposed” and mean that “interlocutory review of a qualified immunity order does not in and of itself confer jurisdiction over other contested issues in the case”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
For the reasons expressed in my dissent in Nuñez-Soto v. Alvarado, 918 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir.1990) (Torruella, J., dissenting), I am forced to reach a different conclusion than my colleagues in this case. I respectfully dissent.