Gerald Eugene Stano, Cross-Appellee v. Richard L. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Cross-Appellant · 921 F.2d 1125

holding that Cronic “created an exception to the Strickland [v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),] standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and acknowledged that certain circumstances are so egregiously prejudicial that ineffective assistance of counsel will be presumed”

How later courts described this case

holding that Cronic “created an exception to the Strickland [v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),] standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and acknowledged that certain circumstances are so egregiously prejudicial that ineffective assistance of counsel will be presumed”
holding that Cronic “created an exception to the Strickland [ v.Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),] standard for ineffective assistance of counsel and acknowledged that certain circumstances are so egregiously prejudicial that ineffective assistance of counsel will be presumed”
stating although the defendant need not “recite some talismanic formula,” he must “state his request [to proceed pro se], either orally or in writing, unambiguously to the court so that no reasonable person can say that the request was not made”
stating that right to counsel “attaches automatically and must be waived affirmatively to be lost, while the [right to self- representation] does ‘not attach unless and until it [i]s asserted’” (citation omitted)

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

Overruled on other grounds by United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253 (2008)
921 F.2d 1125, 1141 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh CircuitAug 20, 2008other groundsmedium confidenceRead it

The opinion

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge,

concurring, in which KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, joins:

I join Part II.B. of Judge Fay’s opinion holding that Stano’s claim of ineffective *1155 assistance of counsel has no merit. I also join in that portion of Part II.A. of Judge Fay’s opinion holding that the circumstances of this case did not trigger the procedures outlined in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 95 S.Ct. 2525 , 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In other words, I join all of the opinion, except I do not join any dicta suggesting that the Faretta right is inapplicable to the guilty plea stage.