finding that admission of confession obtained in violation of Miranda was not harmless error because “the portion of [the defendant’s] confession taken after the Miranda violation – other than the inferences to be made from the fact of the robbery and shooting – was the only concrete, noncircumstantial piece of evidence the state had to prove the premeditation element of the crime”
How later courts described this case
- finding that admission of confession obtained in violation of Miranda was not harmless error because “the portion of [the defendant’s] confession taken after the Miranda violation – other than the inferences to be made from the fact of the robbery and shooting – was the only concrete, noncircumstantial piece of evidence the state had to prove the premeditation element of the crime”
- finding that admission of confession obtained in violation of Miranda was not harmless error because “other than the inferences to be made from the fact of the robbery and the shooting, [the confession] was the only concrete, noncircum-stantial piece of evidence the state had to prove the premeditation element of the crime.”
- finding that “[b]ecause it appears that a[n independent] psychiatric expert will be provided on retrial, I do not think it is necessary for us to decide the issue” of whether the provision of a neutral psychiatrist satisfies Ake
- concluding that there was a “substantial possibility” that the jury construed its instructions to “mean that mitigating as well as aggravating circumstances could be found only if the jury was unanimous”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RALPH B. GUY, Jr., Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in Judge Kennedy’s opinion and write additionally only on the Miranda issue. As Judge Kennedy points out, the government did not appeal the district court ruling that the confession was ob *1133 tained in violation of Miranda. Had that issue been before us, however, I would have concluded contrary to the district court. Since I believe the confession was properly admitted, that obviously influences my judgment on the issue of the prejudicial effect, if any, of the confession in both the guilt and punishment phases of this trial.