Opinion

Jessie Walker v. Thomas E. Darby, Hugh L. Robinson, Jr., and Kenneth Day

  • 911 F.2d 1573
  • 5 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1342
  • 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 16510
  • 1990 WL 126642
Court
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Filed
Sep 20, 1990
Status
Published
Author
Edmondson
On the bench
Johnson, Edmondson, Peckham
Cited by
855 cases

explaining that a “mere scintilla of evi- dence” is not enough to create a genuine dispute of material fact, as “there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reason- ably find” for the non-movant (marks and citation omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that a “mere scintilla of evi- dence” is not enough to create a genuine dispute of material fact, as “there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reason- ably find” for the non-movant (marks and citation omitted)
  • explaining that the party who opposes summary judgment must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice.”
  • finding a question of fact, sufficient to defeat summary judgment, in whether defendant's conversations were electronically intercepted in a manner that invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy
  • noting that “once the moving party has met [its] burden by presenting evidence which, if uncontradicted, would entitle it to a directed verdict at trial, [Rule] 56(e) shifts to the non-moving party the burden of presenting specific facts showing that such contradiction is possible”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by Huff v. Spaw, 995 F. Supp. 2d 724 (2014)

    Walker is factually distinguishable in two significant ways.
    District Court, E.D. KentuckyJan 24, 2014Read it

The opinion

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge,

concurring:

I concur in the judgment. I agree that in a lawsuit alleging the interception of oral communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 , a plaintiff need only show interception of communication, not that particular conversations were intercepted. Given the facts, as detailed in today’s opinion, sufficient evidence raised a question of material fact regarding whether Walker’s communications had been intercepted. I thus agree that the district court erred in finding that no question of fact remained on this issue and in granting summary judgment.

While I concur in the judgment, I believe that much of today’s court opinion is dicta. The district court never discussed whether plaintiff’s expectations of being free from interception were justified, and defendants’ *1580 motion for summary judgment says nothing about the reasonableness of such expectation in the circumstances. The reasonableness point was not raised in district court and not raised on appeal as I read the briefs. Today’s court need not decide the point to decide this appeal. And, on this record, I decline to address the question of when an employee may have a reasonable expectation of non-interception, especially without the district court having first addressed the question. On remand, the district court — with the help of the parties— can still consider the matter of reasonable expectations as more facts are developed, either at trial or in advance of trial.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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