holding that a mere disagreement with a course 5 of medical treatment is insufficient to state a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment
How later courts described this case
- holding that a mere disagreement with a course 5 of medical treatment is insufficient to state a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment
- holding that a mere disagreement with a course of medical treatment is insufficient to state a claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment
- prison doctor could not be held hable for “claims of inadequate treatment by other medical personnel”
- “Prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity unless: their conduct'violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right; they knew or should have known the right was clearly established; and they knew or should have known their conduct violated that right.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
In reversing the magistrate’s 1 denial of Brady’s and Marcantonio’s motion for summary judgment, the majority ignores the analysis and factual predicates relied upon by the magistrate in denying that motion. After reviewing the record, I conclude that the magistrate correctly decided the issue.
The majority rests its reversal of the magistrate solely upon Smith’s admission that he did not fear for his own safety. The majority extrapolates from this admission that Brady and Marcantonio had no reason to believe that inmates in the honor dormitory needed protection from the other inmates and that Smith therefore has not shown a violation of his right to be protected from attacks by his fellow inmates. This analysis contains two flaws. First, it disposes of the case solely upon the subjective knowledge of Smith, the plaintiff, whereas the proper inquiry should focus on whether the defendants recklessly disregarded Smith’s right to be free from attack. Second, it ignores the factual predicates upon which the magistrate relied.
On their motion for summary judgment, Brady and Marcantonio are entitled to qualified immunity unless there exists no dispute of fact that 1) their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, 2) they knew or should have known that this right was clearly established and 3) they knew or should have known that their conduct violated that right. Brown v. Frey, 889 F.2d 159, 165 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1156 , 107 L.Ed.2d 1059 (1990). The majority reverses the magistrate’s denial of summary judgment on the grounds that Smith has not made a showing sufficient to establish that Brady’s and Marcantonio’s conduct violated Smith’s right to be protected from harm by his fellow inmates. Ante at 502-503. A review of the record demonstrates otherwise.
Smith testified in his deposition and contended before the magistrate that defendant Marcantonio, the manager of the hon- or dormitory, and defendant Brady, the guard on duty at the time of the attack, failed to follow a written prison policy requiring that all inmates entering the honor dormitory from the general prison population be screened and searched. Joint Appendix at 67, 70, 72-73. Smith also testified that the inmates in the honor dormitory slept in rooms without doors and that only one guard protected the 115 inmates housed on the three floors of the honor dormitory. Id. at 6-7, 39, 40, 72. Defendants have not disputed these allegations.
The essence of Smith’s claim, therefore, is that Brady and Marcantonio failed to provide the only protection' available to the inmates in the honor dormitory and that this failure constituted reckless disregard for Smith’s right to be free from attack in a prison setting. It seems obvious that inmates housed in the unprotected confines of the honor dormitory are at risk from inmates entering from the general prison population of the Missouri State Penitentiary. Moreover, prison officials charged with responsibility over the honor dormitory have a heightened responsibility to observe prison policies with respect to prisoner safety, if only because there are fewer such policies in the honor dormitory and each takes on greater importance.
As the magistrate recognized, the factual issue whether defendants were reckless or merely negligent in ignoring the prison policies belonged to the jury, not the court. I am not willing to decide as a matter of law, as the majority in effect does, that the defendants’ failure to screen and search inmates cannot constitute reckless disregard for Smith’s right to be free from attack simply because Smith admitted that he felt safe. In my view, the mental state *504 of Smith, an inmate, has little bearing on the mental state and conduct of the defendants, a guard and dormitory manager.
The magistrate properly noted that summary judgment was premature as based solely- on Smith’s testimony. Smith adduced sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute whether defendants recklessly disregarded his right to be free from attack. A jury should pass on Brady’s and Marcantonio’s conduct under the circumstances of this case as it presently stands, or, at least, further discovery is justified. Accordingly, I dissent as to the claims of Smith against Brady and Marcantonio.
. Under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c) (1988), the parties consented to have a United States Magistrate conduct all proceedings and order the entry of judgment.