finding that a widespread history of infested drinking water and inmates sleeping on the floor could be sufficient to notify the director of the jail of the conditions and hold him liable as a supervisor, but that such a history did not exist
How later courts described this case
- finding that a widespread history of infested drinking water and inmates sleeping on the floor could be sufficient to notify the director of the jail of the conditions and hold him liable as a supervisor, but that such a history did not exist
- holding “that a pro se litigant does not escape the essential burden under summary judgment standards of establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary judgment”
- holding that “causal connection can be established when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so”
- explaining that a pro se litigant has the burden of “establishing that there is a genuine issue as to a fact material to his case in order to avert summary judgment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. The majority has reached an issue that was not developed by the district court and thereby has cut short this litigation involving potentially serious Eighth Amendment violations. I would hold that the district court erred in failing to construe the plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally to include a claim against Crawford in his official capacity and would remand the case to the district court for consideration of the official capacity claim.
*673 ANALYSIS
A municipality, as an entity, may be held liable under section 1983 where the municipality causes an employee to violate another’s constitutional rights under color of some official policy or custom. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 , 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-36 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 , 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299 , 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). An action is taken pursuant to municipal policy where the municipality’s authorized deci-sionmakers make the decision to adopt the particular course of action. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481 , 106 S.Ct. at 1299 ; see also Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 791 (11th Cir.1989).
Courts must construe pro se complaints more liberally than they would formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 , 92 S.Ct. 594, 595 , 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Thomas v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 881 F.2d 1032, 1033 (11th Cir.1989). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(f), moreover, provides that federal courts should construe all pleadings to do substantial justice.
Construing the plaintiff’s pro se complaint liberally, Haines, 404 U.S. at 520 , 92 S.Ct. at 595 , it is apparent that the plaintiff’s complaint was directed, at least in part, against Dade County. The caption of the complaint states that the defendant is “FRED CRAWFORD, DIRECTOR COUNTY JAIL.” In Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 , 105 S.Ct. 873 , 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985), the Supreme Court found that an action was brought against a municipal officer in his official capacity where the caption of the complaint named as the defendant “E. Winslow Chapman, Director of Police,” and later proceedings 1 made clear that the plaintiffs intended to file an official capacity suit. 2 Id. at 471 , 105 S.Ct. at 877 ; see also Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1475 (11th Cir.1989). The Brandon Court also held that an official capacity suit is just another way of pleading a cause of action against the entity of which the officer is an agent. Brandon, 469 U.S. at 472 & n. 21, 105 S.Ct. at 878 & n. 21. Accordingly, the district court in the present case erred in narrowly construing the complaint as simply against Crawford in his individual capacity. The district court should have construed the complaint as naming Crawford in his official capacity, and thus as naming Dade County.
Rather than reverse and remand the case on this basis, however, the majority goes on to address the merits of the plaintiff’s complaint. Even though the parties did not present any evidence on the issue of whether the conditions of the plaintiff’s confinement violated the Eighth Amendment, the majority finds that the plaintiff’s allegations regarding sleeping on the floor are meritless. Given the undeveloped state of the record on the Eighth Amendment issue, the majority is premature in ruling on the merits of the claim. See Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420, 1429-30 (11th Cir.1987); Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711 , 717 n. 4 (11th Cir.1987); cf. Cooper v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 849 F.2d 496, 499 (11th Cir.1988) (Court of Appeals may uphold a district court’s grant of summary judgment on alternate grounds if the record supports the alternate grounds).
The plaintiff maintains that he has been sleeping on the floor of a cell for over a year. One of his cellmates, Arrington Rolle, presented an affidavit stating that Rolle and the plaintiff were forced to sleep on the floor of their cellblock due to overcrowding. The issue under the Eighth Amendment is whether the overall conditions of the jail involve wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 , 101 S.Ct. *674 2392, 2399 , 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 , 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1084 , 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986). The plaintiff should have an opportunity to prove that this apparently serious overcrowding in Dade County Jail renders the conditions there violative of the Eighth Amendment. Because the majority has reached beyond the issue developed by the district court, prematurely terminating the plaintiff’s case, the plaintiff will be unable to address this serious issue.
. The plaintiffs briefs before this Court, which apparently are his first court submissions prepared with the assistance of counsel, argue strenuously that the plaintiff intended to name Crawford in his official capacity.
. The Supreme Court also stated that the plaintiffs could amend their pleadings to conform to the evidence under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b), even at the appeals stage. Brandon, 469 U.S. at 471 & n. 19, 105 S.Ct. at 877 & n. 19.