stating that “[s]ection 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[s]ection 1983 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”
- stating that substantive due process violation can be a deprivation of a constitutional guarantee or can occur by actions of government officials that "shock the conscience"
- stating that “Section 1983 3 does not itself create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”
- stating that “Section 1983 does not itself 3 create any constitutional rights; it creates a right of action for the vindication of constitutional guarantees found elsewhere”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Daily Services, LLC v. Tracy Valentino, 756 F.3d 893 (2014)
Braley is also inapplicable.
The opinion
DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person of liberty *228 without due process of law. In a number of decisions, including Wilson v. Beebe, 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir.1985) (en banc), this court, like others, has recognized a distinction not apparent in the language of the Constitution: a distinction between “procedural” due process of law, which sounds redundant, and “substantive” due process of law, which sounds like a contradiction in terms.
I must take it as given that the Due Process Clause does in fact have what the Supreme Court calls a “substantive component,” see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 , 109 S.Ct. 998 , 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), and that circumstances can exist in which a person might be found to have been deprived of liberty without “substantive due process of law.” But I am reluctant to try to come to grips with that “ephemeral concept,” as we called it in Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1328 (6th Cir.1988), absent a clear necessity for doing so. I see no such necessity here. I have no quarrel with the answer the court gives to the question of whether the defendant’s conduct “shocks the conscience,” however, and in all other respects I fully concur in the court's opinion.
District Judge BATTISTI joins in this concurrence.