holding that the test for determining whether an encounter with police constitutes a seizure is whether, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that the test for determining whether an encounter with police constitutes a seizure is whether, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.”
- upholding district court’s finding that defendant had consented to search of apartment where defendant consented to the search in vestibule building after a brief period of detention, he was not physically abused or verbally threatened, and no weapons were displayed
- upholding district court's finding that two officers requesting two men to "come over here for a second," and each officer accompanying one of the two men from street into vestibule of building was consensual encounter
- affirming finding of voluntariness while defendant was in custody, where consent made in public, not in interrogation room or at station house, where no physical or verbal abuse and no display of weapons, and consent did not come after prolonged detention, even where defendants’ English was limited
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)
897 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128
Abrogated on other grounds by Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928 F.2d 558 (1991)
897 F.2d 26, 31 (2d Cir.1990) (“[M]ore than physical companionship and/or a working relationship is required to establish probable cause with respect to a companion of a suspect.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Ruggiero v. Krzeminski, 928 F.2d 558, 561 (2d Cir.1991).
The opinion
PIERCE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority that the conviction of appellant Moreno should be affirmed. However, as far as the affirmance of appellant Libreros’s conviction is concerned, “I dissent from the conclusion that the confluence of earlier events and the substantial experience of the federal agent warranted [the agent’s] ‘plain view’ seizure of the [brick-shaped] package in appellant’s open ... bag.” United States v. Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d 12, 18 (1989) (Pierce, J., dissenting).
Initially, I note that in both Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 , 103 S.Ct. 1535 , 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) (plurality opinion), and Barrios-Moriera , upon which today’s majority relies, there existed a particularized basis for suspecting that the defendant was involved with drugs and that his possession of a particular item was not innocent. In Brown , “the police officer ... saw [, in addition to the uninflated, tied-off balloon eventually seized by him,] ‘several small plastic vials [and] quantities of loose white powder.’ ” Barrios-Moriera, 872 F.2d at 18 (Pierce, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown, 460 U.S. at 734 , 103 S.Ct. at 1539 ) (emphasis added in Barrios-Moriera). Similarly, in Barrios-Moriera , the majority emphasized that the defendant had evinced a prior “interest in [an] Audi automobile [law enforcement officers] were surveilling in connection with a drug -related homicide.” Id. (emphasis in original). Here, however, there is an absence of any circumstance — other than the viewing of the package itself — that specifically links the defendant with drugs.
I do not suggest a particularized basis should always be required. In my view, however, the absence of such a basis requires a greater confluence of general factors than are present here. In this regard, I note that although the majority asserts that Libreros’s statement that the bag contained food was “evidently false,” I am unaware of any finding made by the district court concerning this point. The finding of probable cause is further undercut by the fact that Libreros stopped when he was asked, and voluntarily opened his bag. If we are to view, as we have, a failure to stop when requested by a law enforcement official as supporting “a rising tide of suspicion” of drug involvement, id., we might view Libreros’s cooperation as supporting the contrary inference.
In sum, this case brings us uncomfortably close to holding that the mere viewing of a package of the type present here, by itself, constitutes probable cause. See id. at 17 (rejecting suggestion that “the mere viewing and evaluation of the package alone constituted probable cause.”). I feel constrained to reverse as to Libreros.