concluding that under § 3B1.2, it was not enough for the defendant to prove less culpability than the sole other participant, who had been the "mastermind" behind the criminal scheme
How later courts described this case
- concluding that under § 3B1.2, it was not enough for the defendant to prove less culpability than the sole other participant, who had been the "mastermind" behind the criminal scheme
- comparing *1488 § 410.416 and § 727.203(b)(3)
- comparing Sec. 410.416 and Sec. 727.203(b)(3)
- less restrictive rebuttal provisions applicable
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ERVIN, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
As pointed out in footnote 2, my brethren concede that their holding is inconsistent with the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Youghiogheny and Ohio Coal Co. v. Milliken, 866 F.2d 195 (6th Cir.1989). More recently, the Third Circuit has come down on the side of the Sixth in Bethenergy Mines Inc. v. Director, OWCP and Pauley, 890 F.2d 1295 (3d Cir.1989). Although the rationales employed by these two courts differ somewhat, I am more comfortable with the results they have reached than the one suggested by the majority here and by the Seventh Circuit in Taylor v. Peabody Coal Co., 892 F.2d 503 (7th Cir.1989). It seems to me that by adopting the views of the Third and Sixth Circuits concerning these murky and confusing regulations we do less violence to congressional intent, and avoid both upsetting the statutory scheme and raising due process problems. To preclude rebuttal with evidence that the miner either does not have pneu-moconiosis or that his total disability did not arise out of coal mine employment is unacceptable to me.
For the reasons articulated by our sister circuits in Milliken and Bethenergy, I would affirm the denial of benefits to Taylor.