holding that, because breach of contract is an essential element of a state-law claim for wrongful interference with contractual relations, the claim requires interpretation of the relevant collective bargaining agreement and is preempted by the RLA
How later courts described this case
- holding that, because breach of contract is an essential element of a state-law claim for wrongful interference with contractual relations, the claim requires interpretation of the relevant collective bargaining agreement and is preempted by the RLA
- holding that a motion for an extension of time to appeal filed 64 days after the entry of the judgment “simply came too late”
- applying the RLA’s mandatory arbitration provisions to retired employee who left employment before filing suit so long as claim arose out of employment relationship
- a timely notice of appeal is "mandatory and jurisdictional" and the court has no authority to extend the time prescribed in Rule 4(a)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled — as noted by a later court
Co., 973 F.Supp. 786, 791 (W.D.Tenn.1997) (concluding that Beard is no longer good law).
medium confidence
The opinion
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
The appellees, R. Paul and Scarlett Beard, have petitioned for a rehearing of the decision announced by this court on December 28, 1989, in an opinion reported at 893 F.2d 117 . The petition raises three points, which we shall address in turn.
1. Because Travelers’ appeal was untimely and, as we held, this court had no jurisdiction to consider it, the Beards suggest that there is confusion as to whether our direction to dismiss count two of the complaint applied as to Travelers as well as to the other defendants.
The legal issues that Travelers sought to raise on appeal were identical to those discussed in Part IV of our opinion, and the Beards have not stated an independent claim against Travelers. We assume, therefore, that the district court will dismiss the claim against Travelers.
2. Because Mrs. Beard may have claims that are not subject to the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board, the Beards suggest that her claims ought not to have been dismissed. It seems to us that dismissal of her claims would be appropriate, however, because Mrs. Beard would have no right of recovery if it is ultimately determined that her husband has none.
3. The Beards suggest that because there is no dispute among the parties concerning the proper interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and because the tort claims arose after the termination of Mr. Beard’s employment, the district court’s order remanding the state law claims to the Carroll Circuit Court ought to have been affirmed in its entirety. The Railway Labor Act, however, speaks to “the prompt and orderly settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.” 45 U.S.C. § 151 (a) (emphasis supplied). This court has determined that “where it is clear that resolution of the state claim will require application or interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement ... the claim is considered to be inextricably intertwined with the matrix of the federal labor law.” Miller v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 834 F.2d 556, 565 *124 (6th Cir.1987) (emphasis supplied). The Beards’ state law claims cannot be decided without “reference” to the collective bargaining agreement, see Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1331 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 539 , 107 L.Ed.2d 537 (1989), and under the law of this circuit, the two are inextricably intertwined. Without looking at the terms of the contract, there can be no claim.
The petition for rehearing is DENIED.