concluding that sheriffs failure to investigate discrepancies in identity of person against whom he sought arrest warrant — discrepancies of which he was aware three months before seeking the warrant — could constitute constitutional violation sufficient to form foundation of section 1983 constitutional false arrest claim
How later courts described this case
- concluding that sheriffs failure to investigate discrepancies in identity of person against whom he sought arrest warrant — discrepancies of which he was aware three months before seeking the warrant — could constitute constitutional violation sufficient to form foundation of section 1983 constitutional false arrest claim
- recognizing that the Fourth Amendment requires an officer “to eliminate doubts concerning identity that exist prior to obtaining the warrant and to arrest”
- recognizing that an officer who effects an arrest without probable cause may be protected by qualified immunity
- “This is not a case where time was of the essence in making the arrest. Sheriff Coley had at least three months to resolve his doubts about [the plain- tiff’s] identity.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Most respectfully, I dissent. Judge Hatchett has set forth accurately both the facts and the law. When applying the test of whether or not Sheriff Coley reasonably could have believed that probable cause existed for the warrant and arrest, however, I come to a different conclusion. The arrest of Mary Tillman was a part of a large undercover operation. Sheriff Coley was operating and relying upon information relayed to him by an undercover officer brought in from another jurisdiction. That information indicated to him that Mary Tillman probably was involved. The *322 sale took place very close to her home and the physical description matched. The only discrepancy was the age factor.
To suggest, as appellee’s counsel argues, that Sheriff Coley knew that Mary Tillman would never engage in such activities is nonsense. No law enforcement official should or could operate on such subjective belief and completely ignore the facts of reality. Regrettably, we now are aware that drug abuse and illegal narcotics transactions have pervaded all segments of our society. It seems equally unimpressive to me to argue that Sheriff Coley should have gone with the undercover officer to Mary Tillman’s neighborhood and attempted another identification of the seller of the dope. Someone might have recognized the sheriff and disrupted the entire operation.
The sheriff did the best that he could under the circumstances. He relied upon the information given him for all the arrest warrants. He also made certain that the undercover officer was available for immediate confirmation that the proper individuals were being brought into the station.
It seems to me the majority mistakenly is penalizing Sheriff Coley for being a longtime resident, familiar with his county and its inhabitants. Applying an objective test for the existence of probable cause, one seriously cannot question his conclusion. This was a hand-to-hand sale to a trained police officer. The seller gave her name as Mary Tilma, or a similar-sounding name. The sale took place a few hundred feet from Mary Tillman’s home. The physical characteristics of the seller matched Mary Tillman. It was dark when the transaction occurred, and the undercover officer was not familiar with the area or Mary Tillman.
It seems to me that Sheriff Coley would have been guilty of misfeasance had he not attempted to obtain a warrant for the arrest of Mary Tillman and that he is entitled to the protection of qualified immunity. The finding of the district court that Sheriff Coley admitted that he lacked probable cause is clearly erroneous as conceded by counsel during oral argument. Since the majority does not rely upon this finding, it is not of great significance, other than the fact that it may have influenced the district judge. My review of the record convinces me that the law requires a ruling in favor of Sheriff Coley on the basis of qualified immunity. I would vacate the ruling of the district court and direct the entry of summary judgment in favor of the sheriff.