allowing plaintiff the right to a jury trial
How later courts described this case
- allowing plaintiff the right to a jury trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The issue is whether the local union representing plaintiffs in this case is entitled to a jury on the question whether the international union (UTU) breached its duty of fair representation. The majority opinion refers to the union constitution’s provision in the situation of permanent diversion of work assignments from one railroad carrier to another to arrange a “fair and equitable division of the work involved” (emphasis added). The dealings between the union and the members who had worked for Erie Lackawanna (EL) involved what is described as “road equity” and “yard equity.” (In this case the latter is the real issue). In the prayer for relief the local union on behalf of former EL yard workers requested that UTU, “take all reasonable and necessary steps” to obtain for plaintiffs a “fair and equitable division of all former EL work.” (Majority pp. -). Because plaintiffs concede that they received “monthly displacement allowances” while they were not doing yard work that was formerly done by them when working for EL, it is clear that equitable or backpay relief was their overriding interest, not compensatory damages.
I find that precedent in this circuit compels a finding that no jury right exists in a hybrid action against a union. Judge Con-tie of this court suggested this result in his concurring opinion in Wood v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 807 F.2d 493 , at 504 (6th Cir.1986):
In determining whether the right to a jury trial exists for a newly-created action, the focus is “on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the character of the overall action.” Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 , 90 S.Ct. 733, 738 , 24 L.Ed.2d 729 (1970)
*291 The individual issues presented in this case, as in any hybrid § 301 action, are whether the Union breached its duty of fair representation and whether the employer, Kroger, breached the collectively bargained labor contract. I would find that the fair representation issue is equitable in nature, and therefore not triable to a jury, because the primary relief sought for breach of the duty of fair representation is equitable.
We relied on Judge Contie’s concurrence and explicitly held that a plaintiff did not have a jury right in a hybrid action against his union in Deringer v. Columbia Transp. Division, 866 F.2d 859 (6th Cir.1989) (citing, in addition, Hildebrand v. Bd. of Trustees of Mich. St. Univ., 607 F.2d 705 , 708 (6th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 910 , 102 S.Ct. 1760 , 72 L.Ed.2d 168 (1982)). See also Chrysler Workers Assn’s v. Chrysler Corp., 663 F.Supp. 1134 (N.D.Ohio 1986), aff'd 834 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.1987), ce rt. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2017 , 100 L.Ed.2d 604 (1988).
The majority, I believe mistakenly and contrary to our normal procedures, looks to other circuits for authority to reverse the district court in this case instead of relying on authority in this circuit. Terry v. Chauffeurs, Teams. & Helpers, Local 391, 863 F.2d 334 (4th Cir.1988) concedes that LMRA actions, “and other labor law statutes do not neatly fit any mold of traditional common law actions” (which would mandate a jury trial) but held that a declaratory action complaint in a § 301 action “raises legal issues ... [including] a resolution by the jury of disputed facts concerning whether the agreement was breached.” Id. at 339. Terry, however, conceded that back pay claims and injunctive relief may be equitable in nature, but held that intertwined claims having both legal and equitable characteristics may be heard by a jury. Id. at 338 (citing Quinn v. DiGiulian, 739 F.2d 637 (D.C.Cir.1984)). 1 To the extent the court feels compelled to rely on authority outside this circuit, I find the reasoning of Leach v. Pan American World Airways, 842 F.2d 285, 290-91 (11th Cir.1988) to be persuasive on the question before us. It holds that because the issue presented in this type of case is essentially equitable in nature, no jury trial right exists.
I would affirm the district court because I believe Sixth Circuit authority clearly indicates that plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial in this § 301 case. I accordingly Dissent.
. It should also be noted that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Terry case. Perhaps the court will resolve this apparent split in the circuits. See 57 U.S.L.W. 3826 (1989).