Overseas Education Association, Inc. v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, Overseas Education Association, Inc. v. Federal Labor Relations Authority

BUCKLEY, Circuit Judge,

with whom Circuit Judge STARR joins, concurring:

We concur in all but Part IV of our colleague’s fine opinion. We find its references to legislative history unnecessary, and we cannot accept the use of these extra-statutory materials to place a restrictive gloss on the plain meaning of section 7106(a)’s “management rights” provisions. Before discussing these concerns, we will summarize the basic principles of statutory construction that inform our analysis.

A court’s task in interpreting a statute is to determine its meaning as understood by the legislative body that voted the bill into law. The most reliable evidence of that meaning is the text of the act itself. As the Supreme Court has recently emphasized, a judicial determination that statutory language is clear ordinarily forecloses further inquiry into legislative intent: “Unless exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise, ‘[w]hen we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.’” Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 , 107 S.Ct. 1855, 1860 , 95 L.Ed.2d 404 (1987) (citation omitted). See also United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030 , 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (“where ... the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms’ ”) (citation omitted).

An exception to this “plain meaning” rule arises in those “ ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.’ ” Id. 109 S.Ct. at 1031 (citation omitted). For example, a reference to committee reports may reveal that a seemingly unambiguous word or phrase has a specialized or technical meaning that Congress intended to incorporate into the statute. Such a use of legislative materials, however, must be sharply distinguished from the treatment of legislative history as a source of the law itself— that is to say, as expressing a congressional intent that supplants the statute. See In the Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342-44 (7th Cir.1989), (Easterbrook, J.).

In the past, courts have often failed to perceive this critical distinction and, more generally, the questionable validity of many of these legislative “aids.” In recent years, however, this Circuit and others have expressed increasing concern over the reliability of legislative history as a tool of statutory construction. See, e.g., cases cited in In the Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1342-43 . This caution extends even to committee reports, which are generally conceded to be the most authoritative sources of information about a particular statute. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 712-15 (D.C.Cir.1987); id. at 712 (while committee report may be used to interpret unclear statutory language, it “cannot serve as an independent statutory source having the force of law ”) (emphasis original); id. at 715-20 (Buckley, J., concurring) (discussing dangers of judicial reliance on statements included in committee report for political purposes); FEC v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081 , 1089-90 & n. 15 (D.C.Cir.1986) (decrying “spurious” staff-created legislative history *975 and attempts to manipulate it in order to achieve results in court that Congress as a whole did not sanction); Hirschey v. FERC, 111 F.2d 1, 7-8 & n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1985) (Sealia, J., concurring).

Far less reliable, as sources of statutory meaning, are remarks made during floor debate — even “authoritative” explanations offered by a bill’s sponsors. While a sponsor’s statements may reveal his understanding and intentions, they hardly provide definitive insights into Congress’ understanding of the meaning of a particular provision. Few of his fellow legislators will have been on hand to hear the gloss the sponsor may have placed on a particular provision. Thus members of Congress, in voting on a measure, must be presumed to have relied on the meaning of the words read in context on a printed page. Moreover, a statute’s sponsor may well be pursuing a political agenda in his floor discussion that judges are ill-equipped to detect. See International Bhd., 814 F.2d at 715-18 (Buckley, J., concurring).

In short, legislative history contains too many pitfalls to warrant consultation when there are no ambiguities to be resolved. Here, as our colleague himself acknowledges, the meaning of the statutory language, as it applies to this case, is absolutely clear. The Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute requires government employers to bargain over “conditions of employment,” 5 U.S.C. § 7114 , defined as “personnel policies, practices, and matters ... affecting working conditions.” Id. § 7103(a)(14). Exempted from this duty to bargain are certain management rights, including, inter alia, the hiring, assignment, and direction of employees, id. § 7106(a)(2)(A), and the right to assign work, id. (B). Section 7106(b)(3), however, permits an agency and a union to negotiate over “appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of any [management] authority.”

In this case, DODDS’s changes in work assignments clearly had an adverse impact on the teachers, who had the right to respond; and, equally clearly, the FLRA had the statutory duty to determine whether the arrangements proposed by the teachers’ union were appropriate. Thus, we agree unreservedly with the careful analysis of the statutory text presented by Judge Robinson in Part III and his conclusion that section 7106(b)(3), “in plain English, authorizes negotiation of ‘appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected,’ not by a firing, demotion or pay cut, but by ‘the exercise of any authority under this section by such management officials.’ ” Judge Robinson’s opinion at 965 (emphasis in original).

With all respect, as the English is plain, we find our colleague’s further reference to legislative history and the inferences he draws from it to be inappropriate. We are particularly concerned by his reliance, in Section IV, on the floor remarks of even such careful legislators as Representatives Udall and Clay. These comments are used to support the conclusion that the management rights specified in (and expanded by) section 7106(a) were to be “strictly construed,” their negotiability treated as “a narrow exception” to the duty to bargain, and “any doubt” resolved in favor of negotiation. Id. at 970-971 (emphases added). These qualifications could easily have been written into the statutory text had that been deemed necessary to achieve Congress’ purpose, but they were not. This court has no authority to engraft restrictions onto the statute that its drafters did not choose to use, and that the members voting it into law never had the chance to consider.

We take exception to Section IV not only because we believe it ignores the Supreme Court’s instruction that when “the terms of a statute [are] unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete,” Burlington Northern, 481 U.S. at 461 , 107 S.Ct. at 1860 , but also because the insertion, by judicial fiat, of adjectives and adverbs into straight-forward legislative language can prove mischievous over time. Judges trained in the common law tradition tend to look to the most recent opinion, rather than to its text, for guidance in determining a statute’s meaning. In time, the chain of interpreta *976 tion can supplant the plainest statutory-meaning. In this case, our concern is that the limitations Judge Robinson reads into section 7106 might threaten the balance Congress has struck between federal employees’ rights and management’s prerogatives in pursuit of “an effective and efficient Government.” 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (b).

In sum, we conclude that the statutory provisions at issue unambiguously express Congress’ intent to exempt specified management rights from an agency’s duty to bargain, but to allow negotiations over “appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected” by any exercise of such management authority. As the Act speaks for itself, reference to legislative history is unnecessary, and we cannot agree with our colleague’s use of legislative materials to modify the plain meaning of the statute. Accordingly, we concur in all but Part IV of the opinion.