holding that a district court has the inherent power and authority to order a corporate party’s representative to attend in person a pretrial conference to discuss settlement of the case and to impose sanctions for failure to comply with that order
How later courts described this case
- holding that a district court has the inherent power and authority to order a corporate party’s representative to attend in person a pretrial conference to discuss settlement of the case and to impose sanctions for failure to comply with that order
- affirming imposition of sanctions where court order mandating presence of party representative with complete settlement authority was disobeyed, but noting that “[i]f this case represented a situation where [defendant] had sent a corporate representative and was sanctioned because that person refused to make an offer to pay money—that is, refused to submit to settlement coercion—we would be faced with a decidedly different issue—a situation we would not countenance.”
- stating that the Rules Enabling Act “was designed to foster a uniform system of procedure throughout the federal system”
- upholding sanctions against corporation for failure to comply with court order to have “corporate representative” attend settlement con- *1397 ferenee, even though attorney was authorized to speak on behalf of principals
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
with whom COFFEY, Circuit Judge, joins,
dissenting.
I join the dissenting opinions of Judge Coffey and Judge Manion. I write separately only to emphasize that the most enduring — and dangerous — impact of the majority’s opinion will not be its effect on the conduct of the pretrial conference, but on the relationship between the Judiciary and the Congress in establishing practice and procedure for the federal courts. Recognizing that the line between substance and procedure is at best an indistinct and vague one, the two branches of government have established a long tradition of shared responsibility for this aspect of governance. That tradition is embodied principally — although not exclusively — in the Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 . That Act was designed to foster a uniform system of procedure throughout the federal system, supplemented but not altered, by local rules to take care of local problems. Experimentation at the local level in areas where policy choices have not been made at the national level is permitted. Moreover, there is no question that the judicial officer retains a substantial degree of inherent authority to deal with individual situations —as long as that authority is exercised in conformity with the policies embodied in the national rules. However, the Rules Enabling Act hardly contemplates the broad, amorphous, definition of the “inherent power of a district judge,” at 652, articulated by the majority.
It is significant that, just months ago, in the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub.L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988), Congress made clear its con *666 cern with district courts’ frustrating the careful process of evaluation and consensus set up by the Rules Enabling Act through the proliferation of local rules. §§ 401-407, 102 Stat. 4648 -52. Today’s decision is indeed hard to reconcile with the underlying Congressional concern for uniformity of practice in the federal courts. Indeed, the majority encourages the individual district court to march to its own drummer. Before long, we shall no doubt see the rhetoric of its opinion used to justify far more questionable “innovations” than the strong-arm settlement methodology of the magistrate at issue in this opinion.