Opinion

The Republic of the Philippines v. Ferdinand E. Marcos

  • 862 F.2d 1355
  • 1988 WL 126901
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Dec 2, 1988
Status
Published
Author
Fletcher
On the bench
Browning, Anderson, Schroeder, Fletcher, Pregerson, Alarcon, Canby, Norris, Brunetti, Noonan
Cited by
288 cases

holding that court had jurisdiction over RICO claim where “[t]he effect on the commerce of the United States of engaging in [the fraud was] palpable” and “[t]he criminal enterprise which [the defendants were] charged with conducting consisted in operations taking place within the United States ... [that] had multiple effects on the domestic and foreign commerce of this country”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that court had jurisdiction over RICO claim where “[t]he effect on the commerce of the United States of engaging in [the fraud was] palpable” and “[t]he criminal enterprise which [the defendants were] charged with conducting consisted in operations taking place within the United States ... [that] had multiple effects on the domestic and foreign commerce of this country”
  • explaining that Ferdinand Marcos used Swiss bank accounts to hide $1.3 billion of the Philippines’ money, and while the banks eventually froze the assets, they fought against returning the assets to the Philippines
  • finding that the complaint “sufficiently allege[d] a RICO offense” against the former president of the Republic of the Philippines, a situation where the FSIA did not apply
  • holding that, where the former leader of the republic of Philippines diverted public funds for private financial gain, his actions could not be attributed to the sovereign

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FLETCHER, Circuit Judge,

concurring specially in Judge SGHROEDER’s concurring and dissenting opinion:

I concur fully in the following portions of Judge Schroeder’s opinion: its discussion of the basis for finding jurisdiction based on a well-pleaded RICO claim; its discussion of the basis for concluding that the act of state doctrine is not a prudential bar at this stage of the proceedings in this case.

I concur only in its conclusion that the injunction should be vacated and remanded for further consideration in that I do not agree with its restrictive view of pendent jurisdiction (by the same token, I cannot agree with the majority’s expansive approach). Also, I would stay the vacation of the injunction for a reasonable period of time to allow the district court to reconsider the injunction and its scope in light of the current state of the record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.