affirming trial court’s determination after bench trial that defendants violated protective custody inmates’ First Amendment rights by denying them, but not general population inmates, opportunities for regular communal worship, religious instruction, and private religious counseling without legitimate penological interests
How later courts described this case
- affirming trial court’s determination after bench trial that defendants violated protective custody inmates’ First Amendment rights by denying them, but not general population inmates, opportunities for regular communal worship, religious instruction, and private religious counseling without legitimate penological interests
- concluding that the appointment of a special master was appropriate because “[t]he record here is replete with instances of administrative recalcitrance.”
- finding a prison regulation invalid after a trial revealed “inconsistencies and contradictions” in prison officials’ statements, which' led their “explanations for security concerns [to be] discredited”
- finding that differences in treatment among inmates in terms of confinement will support an equal protection claim
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Shango v. Jurich, 965 F.2d 289 (1992)
To affirm the district court here we need not distinguish Williams, although we think it is distinguishable.
The opinion
FLAUM, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result.
I must reluctantly concur in the judgment of the court, and therefore write separately. The defendants’ litigation strategy in a case of significant public importance has dictated the outcome that we are required to affirm. Their inappropriate form of advocacy and intransigence regarding efforts to effectuate a remedy compel us to uphold an opinion which sweeps very *886 broadly. Indeed, defendants have brought upon themselves the burden of affording to protective custody inmates rights which are not necessarily indicated by recent Supreme Court precedent.
Although the record clearly establishes that the inadequate library privileges allowed to plaintiffs unconstitutionally restrict their right of access to the courts, in my judgment plaintiffs’ success on their other claims was far from inevitable. The protective custody inmates’ first amendment and due process arguments about the scope of their rights to religious services, vocational and educational programs, jobs, recreation, and living conditions called for a more reasoned rebuttal. But the prison officials were unwilling (or impervious to the need) to articulate credible justifications for their perhaps permissible treatment of these inmates. The defendants apparently failed to advance effectively the lack of reasonable and feasible alternatives. Although we customarily defer to their professional judgment in matters of administration, prison officials whose actions are challenged cannot avoid court scrutiny by reflexive, rote assertions that existing conditions are dictated by security concerns and that the cost of change is prohibitive.
The defendants’ and their witnesses’ approach caused the district judge to find them utterly lacking in credibility. They appear to have ushered the district court into virtually insulating his findings from review; as the majority points out, we may rarely hold such credibility determinations clearly erroneous. We may never ascertain to what extent these findings were “punitive.” The defendants certainly invited them by failing to engage the court in any persuasive discussion of penological objectives and alternatives. It is discouraging, to say the least, that a most critical state agency has been found so sorely wanting as a litigant by a United States District Court. See Williams v. Lane, 646 F.Supp. 1379, 1402-05 (N.D.Ill.1986).
In particular, the defendants’ stance once the court decided their liability made the extreme remedy affirmed today almost inevitable. In the opinion of the district judge, the defendants made no substantial attempt at good faith compliance with the court’s directives once liability was established. By refusing to meaningfully comply with the district court’s request for aid in fashioning a remedy, defendants ensured a harsher result than would otherwise have been warranted. While the appointment of a special master to implement the court’s directives is an extraordinary and disfavored recourse, the defendants and their counsel forced the district judge’s hand.
Courts must of course recognize their limited competence in the troubled and complicated area of prison administration. However, prison administrators alleged to have violated inmates’ rights must meet such challenges with edifying and illuminating rejoinders drawn from their unique expertise, not with the modest responses advanced in this litigation.