holding that 9 procedural due process in the employment termination context does not require a 10 neutral and impartial decisionmaker at the pre-termination hearing, but only a right 11 of reply before the official responsible for the discharge
How later courts described this case
- holding that 9 procedural due process in the employment termination context does not require a 10 neutral and impartial decisionmaker at the pre-termination hearing, but only a right 11 of reply before the official responsible for the discharge
- explaining that the Loudermill Court suggested that its decision is an application of principles announced in Goss
- explaining that a defendant could be “so biased that the Loudermill ‘right-of- reply’ process is meaningless”
- “The limited, ‘right-of-reply’ pretermination hearing, as defined in Loudermill, is designed to invoke the employer’s discretion,’ his sense of fairness and mutual respect, his willingness to reconsider.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
As an original member of this court’s panel in Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education, 721 F.2d 550 (6th Cir.1983), aff'd 470 U.S. 532 , 105 S.Ct. 1487 , 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), I am in accord with Judge Merritt’s analysis of Loudermill as it relates to the issues of this case. I write separately to state my original concern about the issue of mootness, but I note that plaintiff’s counsel at oral argument took the position that not all the issues involved were moot. I agree not only with the *1009 result reached and Judge Merritt’s reasoning in reaching that result, but would also note my disagreement with plaintiff’s argument that BOCA requirements equate with or set out the constitutional due process requirements involved in this discharge.