Opinion

Josiah Haynesworth and Fred Hancock v. Frank P. Miller, Chief, Law Enforcement Section, Office of the Corporation Counsel, (Two Cases)

  • 820 F.2d 1245
  • 261 U.S. App. D.C. 66
  • 8 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 437
  • 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 6858
Court
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Filed
May 29, 1987
Status
Published
Author
Van Pelt
On the bench
Spottswood, Ill, Robinson, Wright, Van Pelt
Cited by
356 cases
Authority
More cited than 25.5%

Abrogated on other grounds by Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006)

explaining that " Rule 12(c) requires that the movant show, at the close of the pleadings, that no material issue of fact remains to be solved, and that he or she is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law"

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that " Rule 12(c) requires that the movant show, at the close of the pleadings, that no material issue of fact remains to be solved, and that he or she is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law"
  • noting that a district court’s “[fjailure to take the steps specified in Rule 54(b) is more than a mere technicality; without compliance, a federal court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the order”
  • noting that a district court’s “[flailure to take the steps specified in Rule 54(b) is more than a mere technicality; without compliance, a federal court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the order”
  • noting that a district court’s “[failure to take the steps specified in Rule 54(b) is more than a mere technicality; without compliance, a federal court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to entertain challenges to the order”

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Abrogated on other grounds by Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006)

    820 F.2d 1245, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 1987), abrogated in part on other grounds by Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250
    Supreme Court of the United StatesApr 26, 200642 citing opinionsother groundsRead it

The opinion

VAN PELT, Senior District Judge,

concurring:

I desire to make a short statement as to my concurrence. I commend Judge Robinson on his opinion, in which Judge Wright has concurred, and his attempt to bring order to plaintiff’s argument which is disorganized, verbose, and difficult to follow.

When this case was argued and submitted to the panel, Hancock’s claim had been dismissed as improperly joined. The claims of Haynesworth were standing as against Schwartz, Lyddane and Mooney, the officers who had arrested him. As to Hancock’s claim, I disagree with Judge Robinson’s opinion in part only; I conclude that it was reversible error to dismiss his claim. I think it should have been severed. See: Rule 21, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and Footnote 1, page 7, of Brief of Appellees. He should have full protection against statutes of limitations. The dismissal of Sonya Proctor, the police officer, who arrested Hancock, can be reconsidered if Hancock’s claim is reinstated.

I concur in the affirmance of Miller’s dismissal. While this comment may not be relevant at this stage of the proceedings, I comment gratuitously that Howard B. Horowitz is immune to the same extent that Miller is immune, assuming his acts were taken within the scope of his advocacy duties.

I concur in rejecting the respondeat superior claims against Cullinane and Jefferson and in the dismissal of Jefferson on the basis that there was insufficient personal involvement on his part to implicate him in either the formulation of the alleged policy or its execution. I agree that further discovery should be allowed on Haynes-worth’s claim against Cullinane. Cullinane, in turn, should be given the right to develop the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. It is possible that he could present this defense in a motion for summary judgment. Thus, I also would reverse the dismissal of Cullinane for these purposes. The trial court may or may not conclude that the defense of qualified immunity can be presented in a motion for summary judgment or that a jury issue exists as to this officer.

As to the issue of liability of the District of Columbia, I recognize my tendency as a judge from outside the District to defer to Judges Robinson and Wright and their general knowledge of the intention and history of the District of Columbia governmental action. I agree that liability cannot be based on the theory of respondeat superior. As to the possibility of direct liability based upon proof of the existence of a municipal policy or course of action, I would hold that Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), is applicable based on the status of this case at the time of the ruling of the district judge. Nevertheless, I concur in the action proposed, since this case should have immediate attention. Later review by a full panel of the court is always a possibility, with an issue such as the applicability of Monell .

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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